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ABSTRACT
We develop a novel framework for friend-to-friend (f2f) distributed services (F3DS)
by which applications can easily offer peer-to-peer (p2p) services among social peers
with resource sharing governed by approximated levels of social altruism. Our frame-
work differs significantly from typical p2p collaboration in that it provides a founda-
tion for distributed applications to cooperate based on pre-existing trust and altruism
among social peers. With the goal of facilitating the approximation of relative levels of
altruism among social peers within F3DS, we introduce a new metric: SocialDistance.
SocialDistance is a synthetic metric that combines direct levels of altruism between
peers with an altruism decay for each hop to approximate indirect levels of altruism.
The resulting multihop altruism levels are used by F3DS applications to proportion
and prioritize the sharing of resources with other social peers. We use SocialDistance
to implement a novel flash file/patch distribution method, SocialSwarm. SocialSwarm
uses the SocialDistance metric as part of its resource allocation to overcome the neces-
sity of (and inefficiency created by) resource bartering among friends participating in
a BitTorrent swarm. We find that SocialSwarm achieves an average file download time
reduction of 25% to 35% in comparison with standard BitTorrent under a variety of
configurations and conditions, including file sizes, maximum SocialDistance, as well as
leech and seed counts. The most socially connected peers yield up to a 47% decrease in
download completion time in comparison with average nonsocial BitTorrent swarms.
We also use the F3DS framework to implement novel malware detection application—
F3DS Antivirus (F3AV)—and evaluate it on the Amazon cloud. We show that with
f2f sharing of resources, F3AV achieves a 65% increase in the detection rate of 0-
to 1-day-old malware among social peers as compared to the average of individual
scanners. Furthermore, we show that F3AV provides the greatest diversity of mal-
ware scanners (and thus malware protection) to social hubs—those nodes that are
positioned to provide strategic defense against socially aware malware.
To Keri, my best friend and companion.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, there has been an explosion in the popularity and
utility of online social networks (OSNs) [1] [2]. OSNs have become the dominant
method for sharing photos [3], playing online games [4], finding employment [5], and
finding and communicating with individuals having similar hobbies and interests [6].
Traditional out-of-band communication methods—such as phone calls, traditional
mailed letters, and face-to-face conversations—are in many cases being replaced [7] [8]
by messaging over online social networks. Even electronic messaging and content
sharing that previously may have occurred directly in peer-to-peer (p2p) relationships
also are increasingly being replaced [9] by messaging and content sharing over OSNs
given the functionality these networks provide to interact and collaborate with a
group of social peers.
Although typical OSNs provide useful methods for peers to collaborate, the cen-
tralized, proprietary, and commercial nature of those networks prevents the direct
communication and sharing of resources that have been shown to be valuable in
p2p applications. Ideally, applications would be able to exploit both direct p2p
collaboration (for efficiency and scalability) and social awareness (for connections
to real-world social relationships) concurrently. Developing p2p applications that are
socially aware is, however, not trivial because of several challenges.
1.1 Challenges
In this section, we describe three key challenges in developing p2p applications
that are socially aware.
21.1.1 Challenge 1: Extracting and Quantifying Trust
The complete metadata on relationships among OSN participants is typically
held tightly [10] by the commercial entity running the network. Usually, there
are no published APIs for easily extracting metadata from multiple OSNs to create
independent applications. When openly published metadata on social relationships
does exist, it is typically both limited (direct peer only) and inaccurate—relying only
on simplistic user tagging of social relationships, which is known to poorly represent
real social interaction and trust. Applications that wish to exploit existing trust
among social peers must find and quantify better indicators of both direct and indirect
(multihop) trust.
1.1.2 Challenge 2: Resource Allocation Strategy
One valuable use case for p2p applications is that of direct resource (such as
bandwidth, CPU, memory, storage) sharing. The first generation of peer-to-peer
(p2p) applications assumed full trust between even anonymous users. Such sys-
tems [11, 12] typically failed due to problems with free-riders (leeches) as well as
the injection of malicious or inaccurate content. Second-generation p2p systems
such as BitTorrent [13] were developed to protect resources from abuse by forcing
resource trading. These resource protection mechanisms [14] create necessary ineffi-
ciencies when interfacing with completely untrusted peers. Thus, without effective
peer selection and resource allocation, the probability that resources will be wasted
increases (either lost to free-riding nodes or maliciously consumed, such as in a
DOS attack). The strategy used for allocation of resources can also have utility
within security related applications. Researchers studying containment of worms
on cellular networks have shown [15] that ideal containment can be achieved when
the most social nodes (the social-hubs) are patched first. Unlike cellular networks,
however, true p2p networks do not have the benefit of either central knowledge of
connectivity, centralized monitoring, or centralized management of protection mech-
anisms. Identifying methods to allocate protection resources to social-hubs in fully
distributed systems—those nodes that are positioned to provide strategic defense
against socially-aware malware—is a critical challenge. Decisions for the deployment
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than in networks that have centralized monitoring and management.
1.1.3 Challenge 3: Decentralized Messaging
The proprietary APIs of OSNs facilitate communication among peers only via the
OSN’s servers. OSNs commonly employ a traditional client-server (or client-cloud)
architecture. The commercial entity behind an OSN handles all message passing, ser-
vice arbitration, and request queuing among users and applications in that particular
“ecosystem.”
1.2 A Framework to Solve These Challenges
In this dissertation, we present a novel framework for friend-to-friend (f2f) dis-
tributed services (F3DS) to overcome these challenges for developers of new appli-
cations. We believe F3DS will enable a new genre of p2p applications that run
independently, but exploit social relationship metadata from existing online social net-
works. These new applications can leverage direct communication and collaboration
among participants. F3DS facilitates and maintains continuous direct f2f application
collaboration using social relationships extracted from existing social networks.
We now provide an overview of how F3DS overcomes each of the three challenges
presented in the previous section.
1.2.1 Extracting and Quantifying Trust
F3DS extracts social relationships from existing social networks to facilitate direct
collaboration. With the goal of facilitating the approximation of relative levels of
altruism among social peers, we introduce a new metric: SocialDistance. SocialD-
istance is a synthetic metric that combines direct levels of altruism between peers
with an altruism decay for each hop to approximate indirect levels of altruism. The
resulting multihop altruism levels are used by social peers to proportion and prioritize
the sharing of resources with other social peers. F3DS provides modules for social
relationship extraction and analysis—for SocialDistance approximation—that work
with several different OSNs.
41.2.2 Resource Allocation Strategy
Using SocialDistance as a heuristic, F3DS empowers applications to intelligently
select peers for collaboration and then prioritize resource sharing among those peers.
In the particular context of applications where resource sharing provides a security
protection benefit, we hypothesize that by prioritizing resource allocation based on
SocialDistance, F3DS will ensure that the most social nodes will be the most pro-
tected.
1.2.3 Decentralizing Communication
F3DS simplifies the implementation and deployment of f2f applications by provid-
ing the following services to initialize and maintain f2f communication: identification
and exchange of client IP addresses among social peers, generation and exchange
of asymmetric keys for authentication and encryption of f2f messages, and message
delivery and queuing services among social peers.
Our goal is as follows: Create a cross application framework that simplifies collab-
oration and promotes intelligent resource sharing among social peers. The resulting
framework can be applied to a variety of f2f services. F2f services that are resource
intensive (i.e., bandwidth, memory, CPU, storage capacity, storage I/O) are good
candidates for F3DS. Such applications might include: f2f backup systems, f2f content
caching and distribution, f2f intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS), or f2f
malware detection.
1.3 Evaluation
To evaluate the utility of SocialDistance for resource allocation within a dis-
tributed application, we design and implement a novel flash file/patch distribution
method: SocialSwarm [16]. SocialSwarm leverages the SocialDistance metric to
approximate the relative levels of altruism among peers in a BitTorrent swarm,
so as to overcome the necessity of (and inefficiency created by) resource bartering
among friends. In SocialSwarm, we leverage the existing BitTorrent protocol for
communication among peers.
To evaluate the utility of the full F3DS framework (including SocialDistance
analysis, peer prioritization, and direct f2f messaging) we implement a distributed
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leverages the SocialDistance metric to facilitate friend-to-friend virus scanning. We
now provide an overview of these novel f2f applications.
1.3.1 SocialSwarm Overview
SocialSwarm facilitates file distribution among social peers as well as nonsocial
peers (swarms that contain both socially enabled peers and nonsocially connected
peers) by exploiting the well established BitTorrent incentives for collaboration be-
tween nonsocial peers. It also allows groups (teams) of peers with preestablished
altruism between each other to use resources more effectively by reducing the require-
ment of games between members of the same team. Assistance to peers is prioritized
proportional to social altruism. SocialSwarm can be described as a gather-then-share
technique. Nodes first work as a team to interact with anonymous nonsocial peers,
gathering socially rare chunks of the file being propagated. As the percentage of
chunks held by members of the social group gradually increases, SocialSwarm-enabled
group members turn inward and share the chunks altruistically among themselves.
Rather than giving social peers full preference for collaboration over nonsocial
peers, SocialSwarm’s gather-then-share approach with social peers exhibits levels of
altruism that are inversely proportional to the overall rarity of the file chunks. Our
approach gives faster file dissemination, because the social peers actively try to get file
chunks that are rare in the group, thus ultimately benefiting the group in later stages
when altruism comes into play. With these new ideas, our work is state-of-the-art for
flash dissemination of large files in a p2p network modeled over a social network.
In our evaluation of SocialSwarm, we find that the most socially connected peers
received the greatest benefit, in some cases providing up to a 47% decrease in average
download completion time per peer in comparison with average nonsocial BitTorrent
swarms.
1.3.2 F3AV Overview
To demonstrate the applicability and value of F3DS, we leverage it to design,
implement, and evaluate F3AV, a novel N-version distributed malware detection
system. F3AV provides collaborative malware detection among social peers with the
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most social users on the network, which are the most likely to propagate large
quantities of malware when infected by socially aware malware1. Using F3AV, we
present and evaluate a novel method for varying the required diversity of virus
scanners based on the age of the object being scanned so as to achieve a balance
between high rates of malware detection and object scanning latency. Our evaluation
using the Amazon Cloud shows that by concurrently leveraging diverse scanners across
a social network, a user can achieve a 65% increase in the detection rate of 0- to
1-day-old malware as compared to the average detection rate of individual scanners.
We also show that F3AV provides the greatest scanner resources (including di-
versity of available scanners as well as overall quantity of results shared) to social
hubs—the most social peers in the social network. By providing the greatest scanner
resources to the social hubs, the protection of the entire social network is increased.
Our implementation of F3AV on top of F3DS is publicly available on the F3DS
website [18].
1.3.3 In-network Trust Maintenance
We recognize that maintenance of trust based only on a node’s own direct observa-
tion of peers’ behavior does not benefit from group knowledge—such as that provided
by voting or reputation sharing systems. Individual formation of trust, however, is
more resilient against bias of reputation and vote aggregators. For this reason, we
also create a novel method for individual nodes in a distributed system to maintain
trust with other nodes without relying on reputation sharing or voting methods. In
our method, nodes share authoritative individual experiences with other nodes and
combine collected experiences via a statistical model to maintain individualized trust
levels with other system participants. Specifically, we created and evaluated a novel
distributed algorithm [19] whereby nodes in a distributed system:
• Monitor their neighbor’s behavior (individual “experiences”).
• Store these experiences as “experience records.”
1Malware that propagates itself over social networks
7• Share “experience records” with other peers.
• Compute on-going statistical trust and a confidence interval around the trust
mean based on direct and indirect experiences of peer behavior.
As part of future work, we envision enhancing F3DS to also leverage our novel
statistical trust model for on going trust maintenance. By adding these capabilities
to F3DS, nodes would be able to exploit statistical aggregation of both direct and
third party experiences to maintain on going levels of peer trust.
1.4 Dissertation Statement
We can design and build a distributed systems framework that benefits from
existing social relationships and altruism for newer, more effective p2p applications
and services.
1.5 Dissertation Contributions
In this dissertation, we make the following contributions:
• Develop F3DS—a framework for friend-to-friend distributed services.
• Develop and evaluate SocialSwarm, distributed application for flash file distri-
bution using the SocialDistance metric.
• Develop and evaluate F3AV—a novel social network–based distributed malware
detection system—using the full F3DS framework.
• Develop and evaluate a distributed approach for statistical trust establishment
within collaborative peer-to-peer systems.
1.6 Dissertation Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Our design of F3DS—a novel
framework for friend-to-friend distributed services—is presented in detail in Chap-
ter 2. Chapter 2 also presents our method for approximating SocialDistance among
peers. In Chapter 3, we leverage the SocialDistance metric and show its utility for
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and evaluating a novel distributed application for flash file distribution—SocialSwarm.
We evaluate the full F3DS framework by using it to implement F3AV—a novel
social network–based distributed malware detection system. Details of the F3AV
design and the results of our evaluation are found in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we
present our distributed algorithm for statistical establishment of trust based on peer
behavior monitoring among distributed system participants and evaluate this method
in the context of wireless sensor networks. As mentioned previously, we envision
adding this distributed algorithm into F3DS as part of future work.
CHAPTER 2
EXPLOITING ALTRUISM IN SOCIAL NETWORKS





In this chapter, we present a framework for friend-to-friend (f2f) distributed
services (F3DS) to overcome these challenges for developers of new applications. We
believe F3DS will enable a new genre of p2p applications that run independently, but
exploit social relationship metadata from existing online social networks. These new
applications can leverage direct communication and collaboration among participants.
F3DS facilitates and maintains continuous direct f2f application collaboration using
social relationships extracted from existing social networks.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we provide the design details
of F3DS. The implementation of F3DS is detailed in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 gives an
overview of related work.
2.2 The F3DS Framework
Based on the goals outlined in Chapter 1, we design the F3DS framework using
the following two basic components, as shown in Fig. 2.1:
1. Friend Service Bus (FSB): FSB is a service that runs on each user’s client
device and connects F3DS-enabled applications directly with devices used by
social peers. The FSB identifies social relationships on existing social networks
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Figure 2.1. F3DS Framework Overview
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and provides each application with a list of social peers including each peer’s
current IP address, public key, and a metric to quantify the social relationship
with that peer. The FSB provides f2f messaging services among social peers.
2. F3DS-enabled applications are those that are built on the F3DS framework
by using one or more services from the FSB to collaborate with social peers.
Each F3DS application can have its own purpose and objectives, ranging from
entertainment to productivity to security. Multiple F3DS applications can run
on each user’s client device and share the same FSB.
The FSB running on each social peer provides four core services to F3DS-enabled
applications: social relationship analysis, IP address and key exchange, f2f messaging,
and queuing and prioritization of requests from social peers. We describe each of these
four services in detail below.
2.2.1 Social Relationship Identification
Before nodes can collaborate directly with their peers, they must first identify true
social peers. F3DS depends on one or more social networks so as to identify active
social relationships among users (their relative levels of social connectivity). This can
be any social network over which users interact: such as Twitter, Facebook, Weibo,
Ren Ren, and Myspace. The traditional SMTP email social network can also be
used. A significant body of research has been conducted in analyzing and quantifying
relative levels of altruism—commonly referred to as distance—between social peers.
The notion of distance between social peers has a long history in social science and
was popularized with work originating in the 1920s by Emory Bogardus [20] on racial
and ethnic inequality. We design F3DS to support any analysis module that will yield
a quantifiable and relative level of altruism among social peers. For our particular
implementation of F3DS, we approximate relative levels of altruism among peers




The notations used to approximate SocialDistance between social peers are shown
in Table 2.1. We first approximate altruism between direct social peers followed by
approximating SocialDistance between in-direct (multihop) peers.
2.2.2.1 Altruism between direct social peers. Altruism between two so-
cial peers should not be considered a dichotomy but rather a scale ranging from
minimal to very high. Prompting system users to quantify levels of altruism for each
of their social peers would be cumbersome and impractical. Instead, F3DS calculates
a proportional and directed level of altruism between each given peer a and one of its





where I(a, b) is the number of reciprocal interactions a has had within a given time
window with b, and I(a, all) is the number of reciprocal interactions a has had with
all of its peers during the same window of time. Effectively, A(a, b) represents
the proportional willingness that a peer a has to share resources with each of its
direct peers. It is important to note that A(a, b) is from the perspective of a and is
asymmetric.
2.2.2.2 Approximating SocialDistance between indirect (multihop) peers.
The SocialDistance between two direct or indirect peers can be considered the inverse
of the altruism between those peers: Ds(a, b) =
1
A(a,b)
. Although SocialDistance itself
does not have any absolute meaning, it is a useful synthetic metric to assess relative
depreciation of altruism across intermediate peers and to determine which indirect
paths between peers yield the highest levels of altruism (the shortest SocialDistance
Table 2.1. Notations
Variable Description
A(a, b) Normalized level (0,1] of altruism a has towards a social peer b.
A(s) The short form of A(myself, s)
Ds(a, b) SocialDistance between a and b
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paths). It is important to note that altruism between two peers, A(a, b), is asymmetric
and thus SocialDistance, Ds(a, b), is also asymmetric.
Given the known levels of SocialDistance across two pairs of social peers Ds(a, b)
and Ds(b, c), F3DS calculates a candidate multihop-directed SocialDistance from a
to c with equation (2.2); HopDecay is between 0 and 1 and is set by the evaluating
peer a.









The SocialDistance between any pair of peers (x, z) indirectly connected via a set
of intermediary peers I is defined as the highest altruism level among all known paths
between x and z. SocialDistance is calculated via equation (2.3).
Ds(x, z) =



















HopDecay is thus applied for each additional hop in a given social network path.
Note that F3DS narrows its search to a computationally reasonable search space by
using a specified maximum useful SocialDistance (DsMax) beyond which peers are
not considered as social peers. These calculations are very similar to those of Dijkstra
to find shortest paths; however, instead of adding path lengths, F3DS multiplies
approximated levels of altruism.
For computing cumulative altruism values for a nonsocial peer who is multiple
hops away, we take the product of the individual altruism values along the path.
This conforms to the social network convention of having the decrease in altruism
value proportional to the relative distance. The same rationale holds for having a
linear HopDecay applied at each hop on the multinode path between two peers.
2.2.2.3 Approximating altruism between indirect (multihop) peers.
For all peers a and c for which there exists no direct social relationship, the Altruism
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between a and c is defined as the inverse of the SocialDistance between those peers:
A(a, c) = 1
Ds(a,c)
Details on the social relationship identification modules in our implementation are
described in Section 2.3.1
2.2.3 IP Address and Key Exchange
To bootstrap direct f2f interaction after identifying true social peers, the FSB—
running on each peer device—needs to learn the current IP address and TCP port
numbers used by their social peers. The FSB on each peer also generates a simple
public/private key pair for f2f message encryption and shares the public key with
the user’s social peers. In F3DS, peers use established messaging mechanisms on
existing social networks to exchange IP address and public key information among
peers. Exchange of IP addresses and public key information is one of the functions
of the FSB.
2.2.4 F2f Messaging
We define f2f messaging as sending secure messages from one peer’s client device
directly to a friend’s client device and bypassing online social networks and message
queues. Using such direct and secure messaging reduces the possibility of eavesdrop-
ping by politically, commercially, or maliciously motivated 3rd parties. Direct f2f
messages also provide reduced network latency compared with traditional routing
over social networks. The FSB provides applications with two types of f2f messaging.
First, the FSB provides direct asynchronous messaging given a specific peer ID as
a target. Second, the FSB provides a method whereby F3DS-enabled applications
can send a single message to all of a user’s social peers within a given proximity of
SocialDistance.
2.2.5 Request Queuing and Prioritization
Given that clients have limited resources and the very common possibility that re-
quests from peers—across one or more applications—would exceed a client’s resource
capacity, it becomes critical to be able to arbitrate between the resources available
on a peer’s client device and requests for those resources from social peers. The FSB
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accomplishes this arbitration via queuing and prioritization of requests.
The FSB receives incoming requests from peers into an ingress queue. The peer ID
and application ID associated with each request is authenticated via public/private
key request signing. Given that each peer has limited resources, the FSB prioritizes
the ingress queue entries based on the SocialDistance of each peer that sends requests.
Requesters who have a smaller SocialDistance to a peer offering services will have a
higher probability of having their request being serviced. The FSB also throttles
incoming requests by both limiting the rate of new requests as well as monitoring
available resources on a node (CPU, Memory, disk I/O, network bandwidth). If
sufficient spare resources are not available (tunable thresholds), then the process
that dequeues requests—and passes them on to the specified application—sleeps for
a configurable interval. F3DS-enabled applications can send response messages to
previous service requests. Response messages enter the same ingress queue but always
receive the highest priority (being put in the front of the queue). Each request includes
a TTL (time-to-live) by the requester. This can be overridden (to a lower value) by
the request recipient. When the TTL of a request expires before being serviced by an
application, the request is dequeued and discarded. An application has no assurance
that an F3DS service request sent to other peers will be serviced at all or handled
within a desired time window. F3DS service requests are asynchronous and best-effort
only.
2.3 F3DS Implementation
To provide some level of OS independence, we choose to implement F3DS as a
set of python modules and services on top of an SQLite database. In this section, we
first describe this F3DS implementation and then describe our F3AV implementation
on top of F3DS. We publish our implementation on the F3DS web site [18].
Here, we provide a brief overview of our implementation of the F3DS social
relationship analysis modules and the F3DS mechanisms for f2f messaging. We leave
the majority of the design details to a separate extended version of this paper.
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2.3.1 Online Social Network Modules
We implement F3DS to use proportional levels of reciprocal interactions between
peers to approximate altruism and nominal SocialDistance [16] between those peers.
We expand upon our earlier work by creating social network analysis modules as part
of the FSB implementation not only for Facebook, but also for Twitter and standard
email (SMTP + IMAP). For Twitter, reciprocal pairs of retweets as well as reciprocal
pairs of directed tweets are both identified as forms of reciprocal communication.
On Facebook, reciprocal pairs of wall postings are identified as reciprocal commu-
nication. With email, reciprocal pairs of email messages are identified as reciprocal
communication. This conception of SocialDistance is a departure from Bogardus’
original emphasis on its subjective, affective aspects. Nevertheless, we note that
there is a generally positive relationship between the frequency of social interaction
and the strength of a social tie (e.g., members of the same family will tend to have
more social interaction than members of the same political party). Granovetter’s
classic distinction between weak and strong ties [21] is based on factors that are
all positively associated with the frequency of social interaction. We use existing
messaging mechanisms with Twitter, Facebook, and email to share user IP addresses
as well as to distribute public encryption keys. We make the assumption that the
existing messaging mechanisms over these forms of social media are reliable and secure
enough for the purpose of IP address and key distribution. As part of this research,
we do not consider threat models that attack distribution of IP addresses and public
keys. For each peer that sends an IP address and public key, the FSB calculates
the multihop nominal SocialDistance and communicates the IP, key, and nominal
SocialDistance to each application (such as F3AV) via the shared database. The FSB
also sets a perceived SocialDistance in the database to equal that of the nominal
SocialDistance.
2.3.2 f2f Messaging
As part of the framework, each node runs a Lighttpd web server and provides
both XMLRPC services—for messaging, as well as file serving. When messages from
peers are received over XMLRPC into the FSB’s incoming request queue, they are
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ordered based on the perceived SocialDistance of the peer that sent the messages.
For our initial implementation of the FSB, we use a fixed request servicing (dequeue)
rate. In future implementations, we plan to evaluate adapting request dequeing rates
based on resource (CPU, memory, etc) availability. The FSB provides a python-based
API to applications for enqueuing both f2f unicasts as well as f2f socialcasts. When
sending unicasts, applications specify the peer ID to which they want to send the
message. When sending socialcasts, applications specify maximum SocialDistance to
which they are willing to send the message, and the FSB will send that message to
each of the peers within that SocialDistance.
2.4 Related Work
The PeerSoN [22] system shares the F3DS goal of facilitating direct p2p interaction
between system users. However, PeerSoN lacks application supporting facilities for
social relationship extraction from existing OSNs. Cutillo et al. propose SafeBook [23]
a system for protecting communication privacy of social networking users via direct
p2p interaction. In contrast to F3DS, SafeBook relies on centralized administration
of trust among users via a Trust Information Service (TIS). F3DS is fully distributed
and does not have such requirements for trust in a single centralized service. Both
PeerSoN and SafeBook lack experimental implementations for use with real-world
applications.
Sprout [24] uses existing trust among social peers with the goal to provide reliable
cross network message routing services. This is in contrast to F3DS which has the
goal of providing a generic framework for any social p2p application service.
Yang et al. propose [25] a structure for information sharing between social network
users via direct p2p collaboration. As opposed to F3DS which leverages existing trust
among OSN users to provide p2p services, the goal of the system proposed by Yang
is to help individuals find relevant content and knowledgeable collaborators who are
willing to share their knowledge.
The notion of trust applied to social networks is a promising method to encourage
sharing. SPROUT [24] models a social network-based routing scheme where the path
selected has peers contributing to the highest computed gross trust value. We extend
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the multihop notion of trust to generate altruism values for spatially distant nonpeers
by combining the intermediate altruism values and a linear decay factor proportional
to spatial distance. Different approaches to trust computation over multiple hop
distances have been tried. Walter et al. [26] calculate the trust of a node at a given
distance to be the product of the trust of all nodes along the path. Decay-based
multihop trust metrics have been studied extensively by Marti et al. [24]. Decay-based
models are advantageous because they adhere to the social network trust model of
having more confidence in nodes closer to the source. In calculating SocialDistance, we
choose to implement a linear decay-based model, which is shown in the aforementioned
work, to perform equally as well as the exponential decay-based model.
2.5 Conclusions
We have presented F3DS, a novel framework for friend-2-friend distributed ser-
vices, with resource sharing governed by approximated levels of pre-existing social
altruism among OSN participants.
In the next chapter, we present a novel flash file/patch distribution method,
SocialSwarm, which leverages altruism between peers in an OSN to overcome the
necessity of and the inefficiency created by negotiating for resources. SocialSwarm
facilitates efficient file distribution among social peers. In SocialSwarm, peers leverage




IN SOCIAL NETWORKS FOR
COLLABORATIVE FLASH
FILE DISTRIBUTION
Social networks can serve as an effective mechanism for distribution of vulnerabil-
ity patches and other malware immunization code. We propose a novel approach—
SocialSwarm—by which peers exploit distances to their social peers to approximate
levels of altruism and to collaborate on flash distribution of large files. SocialSwarm
supports heterogeneous BitTorrent swarms of mixed social and nonsocial peers. We
implement SocialSwarm as an extension to the Rasterbar libtorrent library—widely
used by BitTorrent clients—and evaluate it on a testbed of 500 independent clients
with social distances extracted from Facebook. We show that SocialSwarm can sig-
nificantly reduce the average file distribution time, not only among socially connected
peers, but also among other swarm participants.
3.1 Introduction
Online social networks (OSNs) are perpetually increasing in popularity and utility.
Unfortunately, most if not all OSNs have been heavily exploited for malicious pur-
poses. One of the oldest and certainly the most pervasive of all OSNs, SMTP-based
email, has been widely used to self-propagate malicious code, either automatically via
client vulnerabilities or manually via social engineering, in messages sent to unsus-
pecting or inexperienced users. When new malicious code enters a social network, it
commonly infects hub nodes—nodes with higher degrees of connectivity and malware
exposure—more quickly than those users with relatively few social peers.
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Brumley et al. [27] have found a technique for automatic generation of malware
based on contents of a patch file. Computer users can therefore no longer expect
a generous time window for patching their systems before malware is released to
exploit the patch. It is becoming increasingly important to study and develop counter-
malware techniques such as flash [28] patch distribution, which, like malware itself,
exploits hub, cluster, and relative node distance properties to enhance security within
OSNs. Unfortunately, existing methods for fast distribution of large files, including
typical operating system and application patch files, suffer from two problems in
comparison with OSN-based malware propagation. First, systems such as BitTorrent,
and its existing derivatives, implement mechanisms to minimize free-riding; such
mechanisms create inefficiencies. Second, existing peer-to-peer (p2p) file distribution
systems do not ensure that social hubs receive the highest priority in receiving files;
such prioritization of patch distribution is necessary to effectively counter OSN-based
malware infection campaigns.
The mechanisms used to minimize free-riding are typically tit-for-tat and auction-
based p2p incentives [29]. Although these incentives are valuable and necessary in
fostering collaboration among purely self-interested individual peers, they come at
the price of reduced efficiency. In order to barter for resources, BitTorrent reserves
bandwidth in the form of unchoke slots [13]. This reserved bandwidth ensures
that peers with which a node is attempting to barter are provided resources of
reasonable value. Clients typically avoid increasing the number of unchoke slots
because increased numbers reduce the value of each individual unchoke slot thereby
increasing the difficulty of negotiating for higher levels of bandwidth. A client’s offer
of reserved bandwidth to one of its peers does not mean the bandwidth offered will
actually be used. The recipient of the bandwidth offer may not have a sustained
need for chunks held by the peer or a sustained capability of completely utilizing
the offered bandwidth. This holds true even for systems that track and attempt
to maintain peer reputation across different swarms [30]. For standard BitTorrent
clients that do not track peer reputation across swarms, there is some probability,
given optimistic unchoking, that peers will be offered and take bandwidth but will
not reciprocate. Such peers are known as leeches. One of the goals of most p2p
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reputation-tracking systems is to handle leeches. Unfortunately, reputation-based
systems are only valuable when kept fresh with a stream of evidence. For infrequent
p2p users, reputation systems are commonly inaccurate and/or possibly punitive,
given the lack of accumulated reputation evidence.
In this chapter, we propose a novel flash file/patch distribution method, Social-
Swarm, which leverages altruism between peers in an OSN to overcome the necessity
of and the inefficiency created by negotiating for resources. SocialSwarm facilitates
efficient file distribution among social peers. Specifically, SocialSwarm enables groups
or teams of social peers with pre-established altruism between each other to use
resources more effectively by reducing the requirement of resource bartering between
members of the same team. Assistance to peers is prioritized proportionally to
social altruism. SocialSwarm also facilitates file distribution between social peers and
nonsocial peers using the well established BitTorrent mechanism of resource bartering.
SocialSwarm can be described as a gather-then-share technique. Nodes first work as
a team to interact with anonymous nonsocial peers, gathering socially rare chunks
of the file being propagated. As the percentage of chunks held by members of the
social group gradually increases, SocialSwarm-enabled group members turn inward
and share the chunks altruistically among themselves. In SocialSwarm, peers leverage
the SocialDistance metric to proportion and prioritize the sharing of resources with
other social peers.
We evaluate the effectiveness of SocialSwarm by implementing it as an extension
to the Rasterbar libtorrent library [31] and deploy it on a testbed of 500 clients. Each
client is assigned the identity of a real-world Facebook user and given connectivity
characteristics of real-world networks. We find that SocialSwarm achieves an average
file download time reduction of 25% to 35% in comparison with standard BitTor-
rent under a variety of configurations and conditions including file sizes, maximum
SocialDistance, as well as leech and seed counts. The most socially connected peers
yield up to a 47% decrease in download completion time in comparison with average
nonsocial BitTorrent swarms.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we present relevant
related work. In Section 3.3, we introduce SocialDistance as an approximation
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of levels of altruism between peers in a social network and present the details of
SocialSwarm which exploits the altruism approximations. Section 3.4 constitutes an
overview of our implementation of SocialSwarm. In Section 3.5, we evaluate the
performance of SocialSwarm. We conclude with a list of several areas for further
investigation in Section 3.6.
3.2 Related Work
P2P networks, when compared to static single-source models, have exhibited faster
transmission time and greater robustness in dissemination of large files [32]. These
advantages have been repeatedly acknowledged in research on security patch propa-
gation where the standard model for patch dissemination is p2p in nature [33, 34].
Gossip-based protocols have been successful in improving BitTorrent’s file dissem-
ination time. For example, CREW [35], a gossip-based protocol, clearly outperforms
other p2p protocols including BitTorrent for small-sized (1MB) files. However, for
bigger file sizes, CREW incurs a higher overhead than nongossip-based protocols.
Lind et al. [36] show how small messages spread over social networks through gossip.
Our work, however, focuses on the propagation of large files, which have very different
propagation characteristics in comparison with small files and messages.
BitThief [37] highlights the free rider vulnerability of BitTorrent by demonstrating
that entire files can be downloaded without reciprocation. Augmenting BitTorrent to
handle the free riding problem has been the focus of numerous research exercises [38,
39]. The key idea of these solutions is to establish a trust value that a peer accumulates
over the course of time. The trust metric thus penalizes peers that do not share and
rewards those who are active sharers. Although the notion of trust is a step in the
right direction, the peers that participate in a typical p2p swarm change constantly
and the benefit of having a trust metric is often lost.
Zhu et al. [17] propose a novel method of worm containment in cellular networks
by prioritizing the patching of mobile peers based on their social connectivity. Our
technique of collaborative patch distribution—based on social trust on a high level—
exploits the same connectedness property proposed by Zhu, but unlike his work, we
do not assume any global or centralized knowledge of social connectivity between
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peers.
Friedman [40] describes the motivation of utilizing the social network as an excel-
lent medium for patch distribution. One of the more convincing reasons presented is
that OSNs like real life social networks tend to follow social norms. If computer
security is treated as a given norm, a good peer would expeditiously forward a
patch file to its social peers: first, to enhance the overall security of the social
ecosystem, and, more importantly, to protect itself by having peer nodes that are
malware-immune. Our work matches the efficiency of a p2p system with the complex
dynamics of a social swarm to create a unique and robust file distribution system.
Different methodologies have been tried to incentivize sharing in social networks.
2Fast encourages sharing in a traditional p2p network by introducing the concept
of “helper” peers, which assist “collector” peers—nodes interested in downloading a
particular file [41]. The helpers use their idle bandwidth to collect chunks under the
direction of the collectors with the ulterior motive that the collectors will help when
the helpers need to download a file.
KARMA [42] proposes an incentive system with a more fluid “currency-like”
mechanism, where a node can transfer some of its positive currency balance to
bootstrap a lower placed node. Our work uses a multihop-based incentive metric
that automatically confers the advantage of being associated with a higher placed
node or even being part of a higher trust path.
The Tribler [43] system extends 2Fast to social networks by applying the concept
of helper and collector peers to social cliques extracted from p2p networks by grouping
peers of similar characteristics. Although the concept of a drone helper to retrieve
content is useful for assisting a peer with the retrieval of some content, it does not
assist a large group of social peers in identifying and retrieving socially rare chunks.
We share with Tribler the common goal of harnessing a social network for file
distribution, but our work differs from Tribler’s in several meaningful ways. The
collaborative download in Tribler needs “helper” nodes that do not participate in the
actual file being distributed. This is in contrast to our work, where all the nodes in the
swarm actively collaborate in the file being shared. Another important operational
aspect of Tribler is that the helper nodes need explicit approval from the collector
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node regarding the uniqueness and rarity of a file chunk before downloading it on
behalf of the collector node. We develop the notion of social rarity of a chunk that
gives a node sufficient confidence to download a chunk that is socially relevant to
the clique to which it belongs. Tribler’s incentive mechanism does not allow for a
transitive relationship between a prospective collector node and a helper node. All
incentives that are reclaimed correspond to the direct interactions in the past between
the nodes in purview.
The standard BitTorrent protocol uses a fixed and small number (typically 5
to 8) of unchoke slots for playing tit-for-tat with swarm members. When a peer
joins a swarm, it initially chooses a random chunk to download and then begins to
offer this chunk to barter with other swarm members. During these initial stages of
bootstrapping swarm entry and tit-for-tat negotiation, some portion of the peer’s
upload bandwidth is underutilized given the small and fixed number of unchoke
slots. As has been shown in the SeCond [44] protocol, a more efficient use of p2p
bandwidth is to freely share it with swarm peers regardless of reciprocity. Although
free bandwidth sharing is more efficient, it is vulnerable to exploitation by any purely
self-interested swarm member. Tit-for-tat thus serves as a required and effective
enforcement mechanism for minimizing the level of free-riding possible in a swarm
whose members are purely self interested.
Karame et al. [45] defend the analytical rationale behind decomposing p2p peers
engaged in a collaborative download into “small coalitions” to give a near-optimal file
distribution time. The key idea of this work is that the aggregation of locally optimal
solutions obtained in the smaller teams form a globally optimal solution, which is
often very expensive to compute if the problem is not decomposed. Our work builds
upon these conclusions by engaging social peers to work together as teams.
Dynamic configuration of p2p peers of similar characteristics into teams has been
shown to limit free riding in collaborative downloads [46]. A common approach tried
in team-based collaborative downloads is to presume altruism with social peers while
employing tit-for-tat policy with nonsocial peers. This model has been studied by
Galuba et al. [47] where preference is always given to peers. In contrast, we employ
a “gather-then-share” approach with social peers where the altruism exhibited with
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social peers is inversely proportional to the overall rarity of the file chunks. Our
approach gives faster file dissemination because the social peers actively try to get
file chunks that are rare in the group, which ultimately benefits the group in later
stages when altruism comes into play.
3.3 SocialSwarm Design
SocialSwarm combines tit-for-tat/auction between nonsocial peers with an altru-
istic sharing of resources among social peers. A SocialSwarm client freely offers
bandwidth to its social peers based on each of their SocialDistances. For nonsocial
peers as well as those who are distant socially, a peer uses the standard BitTorrent
method of engaging in tit-for-tat to negotiate bandwidth. In Section 3.3.1 we provide
an overview of the design of SocialSwarm, which is followed, in Section 3.3.2, by
details on the notations we use. Finally, Section 3.3.3 provides the core details of how
these notations are combined and used within SocialSwarm.
3.3.1 Overview
With the goal of maximizing collaboration between social peers by reducing the
inefficiencies of BitTorrent while still maintaining game-based techniques to encourage
the cooperation of nonsocial peers, we have developed the following design character-
istics for SocialSwarm.
• Full compatibility with the BitTorrent protocol: SocialSwarm is designed to
leverage the existing benefits of the BitTorrent protocol, while enhancing the
capabilities of BitTorrent clients to collaborate with social peers. SocialSwarm
thus adapts to mixed swarms of socially connected and nonsocially connected
peers.
• Social network independence: With its modular social network analyzer, So-
cialSwarm can exploit the history of connectivity and interaction among social
peers within any capable social networking system, obviating reliance on any
particular social protocol or messaging system.
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• Coordination of chunk collection among social peers: Like standard BitTor-
rent, SocialSwarm begins by relying on peers seeking chunks of data that are
rare system-wide. Over time, however, SocialSwarm increasingly seeks after
chunks that are rare among social peers only—socially rare chunks. Thus,
as a file download progresses, a peer transitions its focus from globally rare
chunks towards socially rare chunks. This transition of chunk collection focus
is the “gather” portion of the “gather-then-share” approach and is detailed in
Section 3.3.3.2.
• Adaptive unchoke slot count and upload bandwidth allocation: Like standard
BitTorrent, SocialSwarm begins by allocating a fixed number of unchoke slots for
playing tit-for-tat/auction games with nonsocially connected peers. Over time
as more chunks are acquired by social peers, SocialSwarm gradually decreases
the number of unchoke slots allocated to tit-for-tat/auction and repurposes the
bandwidth associated with those slots, offering unchoke slots freely to social
peers who are granted bandwidth with a priority based on SocialDistance. This
adaptive bandwidth allocation is the “share” portion of the “gather-then-share”
approach and is detailed in Section 3.3.3.1.
• Targeted nonsocial peer selection for optimistic unchoke: Rather than a com-
monly used metric of time-since-last-unchoke for optimistic unchoke peer se-
lection, SocialSwarm is designed to select peers probabilistically based on the
social rarity of file pieces that they hold. Details of this peer selection method
are given in Section 3.3.3.3.
Fig. 3.1 presents an example of how SocialSwarm running on Bob’s client retrieves
social peer interaction history from social networks on behalf of Bob. When a file
distribution swarm starts, Bob’s SocialSwarm client identifies Bob’s social peers in the
swarm, coordinates chunk collection with them, and altruistically shares bandwidth
with them. The SocialSwarm clients interact with each other as well as with standard
(nonsocial) BitTorrent clients. In this example, Jim’s SocialSwarm client also has a
connection to a leech. Although Jim initially uses resource bartering and preallocates
resources to negotiate with the leech, over time, Jim reserves less bandwidth for
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Figure 3.1. SocialSwarm Interaction Overview
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resource bartering and openly shares its bandwidth with its social peers. By reserving
fewer resources for specific peers, Jim’s risk is diversified given that his reliance on
any particular node is reduced. Thus, even though Jim is not explicitly aware of the
leech, SocialSwarm’s diversified collaboration allows it to be less affected by the leech
in comparison with standard BitTorrent clients.
3.3.2 Notations
Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 respectively provide an overview of the given, measured,
and derived variables used by SocialSwarm. All variables are from the perspective of
each node in the system. Each node independently receives, measures, and derives
its own set of variables. Each measured variable is over a time period of ti. Each
derived variable is recalculated each ti. The given and measured variables that could
not be fully described in the table are described in detail in this section. The next
section (3.3.3) describes the derived variables along with the SocialSwarm algorithm.
3.3.2.1 Overall rarity for each given chunk. Each peer first calculates
A(b) for all peers b in its social network using the methodolgy presented in Sec-
Table 3.1. Given Variables
Variable Description
A(a, b) Normalized level (0,1] of altruism a has towards a social peer b.
A(s) The short form of A(myself, s)
Ds(a, b) SocialDistance between a and b
DsMax Maximum SocialDistance whereby a client considers peers to be part
of its social network.
C Set of chunks in the file being downloaded. Knowledge of this set is
provided by the .torrent file used to start the swarm.
ti The time interval i. The interval used here is the optimistic unchoke
interval (commonly 30 seconds).
S The set of social peers (Ds <<∞) that are using a SocialSwarm-enabled
BitTorrent client. To form S, a list of all peers is retrieved from the
torrent tracker; nonsocial peers are excluded.
N The set of all other (nonsocial) peers participating in the swarm
(where SocialDistance =∞). To form S, a list of all peers is retrieved
from the torrent tracker, and social peers are excluded.
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Table 3.2. Measured Variables
Variable Description
V (ti, c, n) 0 or 1 indicating the availability of a particular chunk, c,
at a particular peer, n, at time interval ti.
This information is shared between peers and the tracker
as part of the BitTorrent protocol.
Bs(ti) The percentage of a client’s upload bandwidth
used at ti for altruistic sharing with its social peers.
(each client measures its own bandwidth)
Bn(ti) The percentage of a client’s upload bandwidth
used at ti for bartering with its nonsocial peers.
(each client measures its own bandwidth)
Ro(ti, c) The overall rarity of a chunk c across all peers,
social and nonsocial, at ti.
Rs(ti, c) The social rarity of a chunk c across its set S of social
peers at ti.
Rn(ti, c) The nonsocial rarity of a chunk c across its set N of
nonsocial peers at ti.
Table 3.3. Derived Variables
Variable Description
Rw(ti, c) The combined weighted rarity at ti.
RA(ti) The average social rarity across all the chunks C at ti.
H(ti, p) The weighted rarity of chunks held by a peer p at ti.
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tion 2.2.2. For each given chunk c, a peer calculates the overall rarity of the chunk
across all peers in the swarm (peers in S and N) via equation (3.1).
Ro(ti, c) =
{








3.3.2.2 Social rarity for each given chunk. For each given chunk c, a peer














This equation allows each node to weigh the priority of each chunk proportionally
with the altruism expressed towards each of the node’s online and in-swarm social
peers. The chunks that are rare to social peers connected by shorter SocialDistances,
and thus higher levels of altruism, are assigned a higher priority than the chucks that
are rare to peers connected by higher SocialDistances.
3.3.2.3 Nonsocial rarity for each given chunk. A peer calculates the
rarity of a given chunk across its set N of nonsocial peers using equation (3.3).
Rn(ti, c) =
{









SocialSwarm varies the behavior of standard BitTorrent in three basic ways.
Table 3.4 lists these three changes with their respective input heuristics. Each of
these actions and heuristics is described in detail below:
3.3.3.1 Adaptive bandwidth allocation. SocialSwarm leverages munificence
between social peers by dynamically allocating a portion of available bandwidth
toward free bandwidth sharing with social peers.
Karame et al. [45] show that combining locally optimal solutions of the smaller
social teams would give a globally optimal solution for the entire social network.
Hence, we introduce a concept of social rarity that is unique to different cliques in
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Table 3.4. SocialSwarm in a Nutshell
SocialSwarm Action Input Heuristic
1 Vary % bandwidth offered % of game completed (from social
to social vs nonsocial peers group perspective)
2 Vary the set of targeted chunks Bandwidth % used
based on the group (social or by social &
nonsocial) being collaborated nonsocial peers
with currently
3 Probabilistically unchoke Rank peers based
the nonsocial peers that on the rarity of
hold the most desired the chunks that they
chunks hold
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the social graph and is easy to compute. We also incorporate the overall rarity of a
chunk to get a fair representation of actual rarity.
As the allocation level of bandwidth for social peers increases and is actively
used, the number of unchoke slots available for bartering with nonsocial swarm peers
decreases. To determine what portion of its available upload bandwidth a client
should allocate to social peers, SocialSwarm uses the average rarity of chunks across
social peers as a heuristic. Effectively the assessment of the rarity of all chunks across
social peers is how SocialSwarm determines the stage of the game.
A SocialSwarm client estimates the average social rarity for all chunks at each







A SocialSwarm client then allocates a certain maximum percentage of its band-
width (MaxSocialBandwidth=(1−RA(ti))) for use with its social peers. Using levels
of altruism towards social peers, a SocialSwarm client will put its social peers into an
ordered list. Starting at the top of this list (those peers with the highest altruism), a
peer will unchoke its social peers one by one until either the predetermined MaxSo-
cialBandwidth percentage of upload capacity has fully been consumed by its social
peers or a maximum limit on unchoked social peers is reached. This method ensures
that the peers with the highest amount of aggregate social altruism—typically those
peers who have a higher degree of connectivity—are allocated the greatest bandwidth
and thus are potentially able to receive the file faster than peers with lower degrees
of social connectivity.
All bandwidth not allocated or consumed by social peers is allocated to traditional
BitTorrent unchoke slots (of reasonable size) and used for bandwidth bartering.
3.3.3.2 Chunk prioritization. When social clients initially join swarms and
when social bandwidth available from social peers is scarce, they must barter for
bandwidth and chunks with nonsocial peers. Initially, clients will target chunks that
are rare across nonsocial peers. As social peers acquire an increasing percentage of
chunks, the average rarity of chunks across social nodes decreases and more bandwidth
is allocated toward social purposes. As social peers increase their usage of this
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bandwidth, a client will increasingly target chunks that are rare across social peers
(as opposed to chunks that are rare across nonsocial peers).
SocialSwarm is thus analogous to a real-world tribe or clan whose members ini-
tially barter with nonclan members for goods not yet available in the clan. As more
goods are obtained by clan members, they gradually decrease their external bartering
and increase the amount of free sharing of goods within the clan. The amount of
bartering with external, self-interested entities is thus determined by the availabilty of
goods (chunks) within the clan. Here, availability is defined as both chunk possession
and ability to share (bandwidth availability).
A SocialSwarm client accomplishes this collaboration by varying its calculation
of chunk rarity based on the percentage of bandwidth actively being used by social
peers, denoted by Bs(ti), and the percentage of bandwidth used by nonsocial peers,
denoted by Bn(ti). Both Bn(ti) and Bs(ti) may be 0% concurrently if none of a node’s
bandwidth is being used by any of its peers.
The level of influence that social peers’ chunk holdings exert over a node’s con-
cept of chunk rarity increases as the level of bandwidth sharing among social peers
increases. When the majority of its bandwidth is used for bartering with nonsocial
peers (when Bn(ti) is large), a SocialSwarm client will focus mostly on chunks that are
rare across nonsocial nodes by making Rn(ti, c) dominant. Alternatively, when the
majority of its bandwidth is used for collaboration with social peers (when Bs(ti)
is large), a SocialSwarm client will focus mostly on chunks that are rare across
social nodes by making Rs(ti, c) dominant. When little of its bandwidth is in use
(when both Bn(ti) and Bs(ti) are small), a SocialSwarm client will use the traditional
BitTorrent algorithm of focusing on chunks rare to the swarm overall by making
Ro(ti, c) dominant.
Thus, using its current Bs(ti) and Bn(ti) bandwidth percentages as weights, a
SocialSwarm client combines the social, nonsocial, and overall rarities to form a
combined weighted rarity for each given chunk using equation (3.5).
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Rw(ti, c) = Rn(ti, c)∗Bn(ti)+
Rs(ti, c)∗Bs(ti)+
Ro(ti, c)∗(1−Bn(ti)−Bs(ti)) (3.5)
A SocialSwarm client prioritizes the download of chunks from its connected peers
based on their combined weighted rarity, Rw(ti, c). This allows a client to coordinate
its collection of socially rare chunks with its social peers.
3.3.3.3 Optimistic unchoke candidate selection. Typical BitTorrent im-
plementations use either random selection or a longest-since-unchoke heuristic in de-
ciding which peer should be optimistically unchoked for the next round. SocialSwarm
instead probabilistically selects a peer out of a prioritized list ordered on availability
of rare chunks at each peer. Thus, a peer will target a peer with the largest group
of rare chunks at each time interval ti by calculating the level of rare chunks held by
each peer using equation (3.6).
For p ∈ S ∪N,
H(ti, p) =
∑
c∈C V (ti, c, p)×Rw(ti, c)
|C|
(3.6)
Using its list of social peers ordered on H(ti, p), a peer will randomly choose the
next peer for probabilistic unchoke using proportional selection based also on H(ti, p).
3.4 Implementation and Test Setup
In this section, we first present details of our SocialSwarm implementation. Sec-
ond, we provide an overview of our test infrastructure. Next, we discuss the social
network data set used to drive our tests, and finally, we analyze the performance of
SocialSwarm in comparison with the standard BitTorrent protocol.
3.4.1 Implementation
We implement the SocialSwarm algorithm as an extension to the Rasterbar libtor-
rent library [31] version 0.13.1. Libtorrent is a library leveraged by a variety of
different GUI- and text-based front ends to provide full BitTorrent functionality.
Enhancing libtorrent with SocialSwarm as an extension allows SocialSwarm to be used
with a variety of existing BitTorrent clients. To evaluate the SocialSwarm BitTorrent
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extension, we use an unmodified version of qBittorrent v1.1.0, a Qt-based libtorrent
front end [48].
SocialSwarm-enabled libtorrent receives a list of known social peers, including
relative SocialDistances for each peer and the peer’s most recent known global IP
address. SocialSwarm compares its list of known social peer IP addresses with the IP
addresses of each of the peers in BitTorrent swarms as received from the BitTorrent
tracker to find social peers who are participating in each swarm. Once a social peer is
identified, SocialSwarm-enabled libtorrent uses a new flag on the BitTorrent extended
peer handshake to determine if the social peer is SocialSwarm-enabled. If a social
peer is identified, but does not support the SocialSwarm protocol, then SocialSwarm
libtorrent will treat the peer as a nonsocial peer. Apart from matching IP addresses
and checking its SocialSwarm flag, SocialSwarm currently does no other social peer
verification. A social network analyzer is developed to take a set of user interactions
within the social network—in this case Facebook wall postings—and first calculate
proportional levels of direct altruism between the Facebook users in the data set and
then calculate levels of indirect altruism. More details are found in the next section.
3.4.2 Social Network Data Set
To evaluate SocialSwarm, we use an anonymized data set from interactions—
wall postings—of 500 Facebook users [49]. For each social network member, we
analyze the number of reciprocal wall postings within a given time period. Each
pair of reciprocal postings is considered a single interaction. These interactions are
used to determine the single-hop/direct levels of altruism between Facebook users.
We use the inverse of this altruism as our single-hop/direct SocialDistance between
peers. Using these single-hop SocialDistances, we calculate the multihop altruism and
SocialDistances using a HopDecay of 0.95 with the method described in Section 3.3.
After constructing the social tree for all users in the Facebook data set, we choose a
single peer and do a breadth first walk over the tree until a total of 500 social peers
is selected (traversed). We then assign each of these 500 social peers to a virtual
SocialSwarm client for our evaluation. Each node has knowledge only of its own
social peers (rather than global knowledge) and considers all other nodes outside of
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its maximum SocialDistance as “nonsocial.”
Each client is assigned a unique virtual machine with a unique IP address. We
make the assumption that the social network analyzer has a method of determining a
public IP address for known social peers. This IP address determination would occur
either via extraction from existing social network interactions or some extension to
those interactions that enables extraction of peer IP addresses for direct and indirect
social peers. IP address identification of users is dependent on the social network
being used. Email, for example, commonly includes the IP address of the original
sender as one of the headers. This is also true for certain webmail systems, such
as Hotmail and Yahoo mail. There are methods of obtaining users’ IP addresses on
MySpace [50, 51] and until recently, IP addresses of Facebook users could be directly
extracted from the email notifications sent on activity between social peers, such as
wall postings [52]. This information, when coupled with the peer interaction data
set, could uniquely give the IP addresses of the users helping to bootstrap our social
network. To incorporate dynamically changing IP addresses, Koolean [53] proposes
a solution whereby each user is associated with a permanent identifier and coupled
with a challenge-response mechanism with the social peers, the user is verified, and
the current IP address of the user is deemed authentic. The updated connection
details of the newly joined peer are distributed across the social network. Because
the main focus in our work is to demonstrate faster file distribution, we have not
yet incorporated automatic identification of social peer IP addresses into the social
network analyzer.
The 500 users in our experiments were extracted from a much larger data set of
Facebook wall postings which contained over 43,000 nodes in total. We thus utilized
less than 1.2% of the total social network data set. Unlike our evaluation nodes,
real-world users of SocialSwarm would not be restricted to searching for social peers
among an isolated group of 500 nodes, but rather could search for and utilize any
available peers on their full social network within their chosen max SocialDistance.
For example, by increasing the number of social network nodes that we included in our
analysis to 5000 and given no variation in maximum SocialDistance, we found a 55%
average increase in the number of peers a node would consider as its peers. Fig. 3.2
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shows the number of single-hop/direct and multihop peers each node considers as part
of its social network given a maximum SocialDistance. Fig. 3.3 shows the number of
peers each node considers as part of its social network when the subset of the data
is expanded to include 5000 nodes total. Although our experiments constrained each
node to search only for social peers within a very small subset of the social network,
and given the differences between Fig. 3.2 and Fig. 3.3, it is clear that in real-world
deployments of SocialSwarm nodes would have many additional peers from which to
choose.
A peer continues a shortest-path-first search of its social network adding new
social peers until some maximum allowable SocialDistance is reached. Based on this
Facebook data set, Fig. 3.4 shows the average number of social peers each user has
in relation to the maximum allowable SocialDistance. Although the number of addi-
tional peers continues to increase at a reasonable rate with greater SocialDistances,
the relative altruism expressed toward those additional peers significantly degrades.



























































































































Figure 3.5. Average Aggregate Altruism from Each Peer Based on Maximum
SocialDistance
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maximum SocialDistance is varied. This figure shows a drop off in altruism increase
beyond a maximum SocialDistance of 150 to 200.
It is important to note that SocialSwarm is not dependent on any specific social
peers being online or available; SocialDistance is used for prioritizing bandwidth
offered. Any unused bandwidth due to oﬄine peers will be offered to other social
peers who are online, even if they have a higher SocialDistance. If no social peers are
online or if those that are online are not consuming bandwidth, then SocialSwarm
will revert to interacting with nonsocial peers exclusively.
3.4.3 Test Infrastructure
Our testbed consists of 20 high-performance servers. Each server has 24GB of
RAM and 8 Intel-based Xeon CPU cores (two quad core Xeon L5420 processors
per system). All servers are fully connected through a gigabit switch with a fully
connected 68Gbps back-plane. A torrent tracker is run on a separate machine that
also has full gigabit connectivity to the same network switch. On each server, we
create 25 virtual clients for a total of 500 virtual clients. Each client runs Debian
Linux version 5.0.3 inside of an OpenVZ virtual container. The storage for each
virtual container is located on a set of high performance SAN arrays with 15K rpm
drives to ensure that the probability of I/O contention is minimized. Network tuning
and shaping is put in place so that each virtual client can be tuned independently with
each of the following metrics: incoming maximum throughput, outgoing maximum
throughput, incoming packet latency, and outgoing packet latency.
CPU, network, memory, and disk I/O are monitored on all servers to ensure that
resource contention between the virtual environments did not occur.
3.5 Evaluation
We evaluate SocialSwarm using the infrastructure described in Section 3.4.3. We
now provide an overview of our testing methodology, followed by the results of our
evaluation.
41
3.5.1 Evaluation Methodology and Criteria
In order to evaluate the flash-file distribution speeds of SocialSwarm in comparison
with standard BitTorrent, we preload a single peer in the system with the file contents,
making it the sole seed for the system. We then start all clients within 10 seconds of
each other. We assume that in real-world use, external mechanisms for communicating
torrent availability and automatic triggering of swarm participation exist. Likely such
a mechanism would use messaging capabilities of the social networks themselves. In
all experiments, we use the parameters, shown in Table 3.5, as input to each of the
tests, unless otherwise specified.
The network configuration (including latency between peers) was made indepen-
dent of each node’s social connectivity. A vast majority (489 peers) of the 500 peers
are assigned a maximum upload bandwidth of 256Kbit (32KB) per second and a
maximum download bandwidth of 1Mbit (128KB) per second. The remaining 11
peers are assigned a maximum upload bandwidth of 2.5MB/second and a maximum
download bandwidth of 5MB/second. One of these 11 high-speed peers is chosen as
the seed. These bandwidth capabilities attempt to simulate a mix of home users with
slower Internet connections combined with a few corporate/educational/FTTH (fiber-
to-the-home) users (including the seed) with much faster Internet connections [54].
Each data point provided in this section represents an average across 10 runs, with
each run using an identical configuration of nodes including seeds.
Table 3.5. Baseline Test Parameters
Parameter Value
File Size 25 MB
RTT Interpeer Latency 48 ms
Altruism HopDecay 0.95
Maximum SocialDistance (DsMax) 400
Maximum Number of Concurrently 30
Unchoked Social Peers
Leeches (Noncontributing Peers) 0
Seed Bandwidth 2.5MB/sec
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3.5.2 Comparison of Basic Download Time
In this section, we evaluate the average download time of SocialSwarm compared
to that of standard BitTorrent. One of our first tests is to compare the average time
required for a single file to be dispersed to all participating peers.
Fig. 3.6 provides a cumulative density function (CDF) of the 500 peer file distri-
bution time for a fully socially enabled run as well as a nonsocially enabled run.
As shown in Table 3.6, the average download time of SocialSwarm for the 499
peers is reduced by 25.7% compared to BitTorrent. The performance gain (33.5%)
for the most socially connected peers (top 1%) is greater than the one (15.7%) of the
least socially connected peers (bottom 1%).
Fig. 3.7 shows the average download rate per peer over time. The first minute or
so of the experiment shows a significant spike and fluctuation in the download rate
for all peers. This is due to the fact that all peers are initiating connections with the
tracker as well as with each other. All peers are sharing chunk availability maps with

























Figure 3.6. Social vs Nonsocial CDF of 25MB file and 0 Leeches
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Table 3.6. Average Download Time and Percent Improvement with a 99% confidence
interval
Nonsocial Social Top 1% Bottom 1%
Social Social
Download Time (sec) 654±11 486±3 435±17 551±22





















Figure 3.7. Client Download Rate Comparison
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After about 180 seconds, the nonsocial peers level out in their sustained bandwidth
usage. The social peers, however, slowly allocate more bandwidth to social peers as
the average social rarity of chunks decreases; this is shown in Fig. 3.8. It is this
bandwidth surge—the peak of which is around 400 seconds into the test—that allows
social peers to complete earlier and turn into seeds earlier.
The results of the first 60 seconds of average social rarity are inaccurate due
to lack of social peer and chunk availability information during system start-up and
initialization. Social peers must find and establish connections with other social peers,
then receive piece availability bitmaps from those social peers before declaring that
chunks are truly socially rare.
These figures show that for both social and nonsocial swarms, rarity of chunks
nears zero around 200 seconds before the download rate nears zero. This is because
rarity is averaged across both downloading clients and seeds. Swarm participants
that become seeds earlier do not necessarily decrease the average bandwidth used per














Figure 3.8. Chunk Rarity Reduction Comparison
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by other peers, and the new seeds reduce the average rarity of chunks.
3.5.3 Effect of File Size
In order to see the impact of file size on the performance of flash file distribution,
we use four different file sizes from 25M to 100M, increased by 25M, as shown
in Fig. 3.9. The x-axis represents the file size and the y-axis shows the average
peer throughput (KB/s). With an increase of file size from 25MB to 100MB, the
performance of standard BitTorrent increased by 4% on average and the performance
between social nodes increased by 9% on average.
It is observed that the greatest increase in bandwidth is realized by the most
socially connected peers. The 1% of peers in the system with the highest degree of
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Figure 3.9. Effect of File Size on Peer Throughput
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3.5.4 Maximum SocialDistance
Maximum SocialDistance (DsMax) is one of the important parameters in Social-
Swarm. By way of review, this is the maximal SocialDistance whereby a peer would
consider a peer to be part of its social network. Maximum SocialDistance can thus
be considered as a radius from a peer to the perimeter of its social network.
Fig. 3.10 shows the average per peer throughput as maximum SocialDistance is
increased. A maximum SocialDistance of 0 is effectively the same as disabling the
SocialSwarm protocol. It can be seen that even low maximums of SocialDistance—
such as 25—yield considerable improvements in per-client throughput compared with
nonsocial clients. As bandwidth utilization improves while increasing the maximum
SocialDistance, the percentage of improvement decreases at each step.
3.5.5 Effect of Additional Seed Capacity
Table 3.7 shows the negligible effect of adding a second high bandwidth seed into
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Figure 3.10. Effect of Maximum SocialDistance on Peer Throughput
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Table 3.7. Average Download Time and Improvement for Two Seeds
Nonsocial Social
1 Seed (sec) 654 491
2 Seeds (sec) 649 486
Improvement (%) 0.6 1.1
dependent on p2p bandwidth and unchoke slot availability than on seed bandwidth.
3.5.6 Effect of Leeches
We conduct several experiments to identify how SocialSwarm compares with
standard BitTorrent when faced with varied numbers of nonsocial leeches (additional
peers each consuming bandwidth from the system but not contributing reciprocally).
We make the assumption that unless they are infected with malware, SocialSwarm-
enabled peers will typically behave properly and share their bandwidth resources
altruistically with their social peers (and not leech bandwidth from social peers).
As shown in Fig. 3.11, the CDF between social and nonsocial torrent download
times follows the same pattern as the baseline 25MB tests (Fig. 3.6). Table 3.8
compares the average download time between the base run of 0 leeches with the
download time when 100 and 200 leeches are present, respectively.
Fig. 3.12 shows the relative throughput degradation as number of leeches is in-
creased (from 0 to 100 and from 0 to 200). The throughput percentages in this
graph are relative to runs without leeches in the swarm. Thus, although nonsocial
swarms have a lower throughput than social swarms, the 0 leech mark in this graph
is shown at 100%, representing no performance degradation in comparison with each
swarm type’s base case. Leeches are intentionally configured with a very small level of
upload bandwidth capacity. Leeches are added to the swarm before the 500 peers are
started. This is done with the goal of intentionally establishing connections to and
consuming bandwidth from the seed before other nodes start. In the case of socially
enabled swarms, we assume that although leeches may have social relationships with
each other, they have no social relationships to other peers within the swarm. It


























Figure 3.11. Social vs Nonsocial CDF of 25MB File and 100 Leeches
Table 3.8. Average Download Time Based on # of Leeches
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Figure 3.12. Effect of Leeches on Received Bandwidth
50
(25%) when faced with leeches. The most socially connected peers have the least
performance degradation (6%). This performance degradation delta is attributed to
the fact that peers with higher levels of social connectivity have a larger number of
peers with which they may altruistically share bandwidth. Based on the assumption
that social peers are less likely to exhibit malicious behavior than unknown nonsocial
peers, SocialSwarm clients target known social peers when deciding those peers with
which to establish outgoing and incoming connections. This may increase aversion
to leeches. By unchoking a higher number of peers concurrently in comparison with
standard BitTorrent, SocialSwarm distributes the upload and download bandwidth
used across a larger number of peers, thus diversifying the risk that any individual
malicious peer might adversely affect a client’s performance.
3.5.7 Bandwidth Contribution and Unchoke Slot Allocation
Fig. 3.13 shows, for a given SocialSwarm, the average percentage of bandwidth
used for interacting with nonsocial peers and, stacked on top of that, the additional
percentage of bandwidth used for interacting with nonsocial peers. This figure shows
that SocialSwarm does not replace interaction with nonsocial peers, but rather in-
creases the percentage of bandwidth utilized on each peer. Fig. 3.13 also shows the
average number of social peers a node will unchoke over time. An offer of bandwidth
to a social peer in no way guarantees that the bandwidth will actually be used by the
offer recipient. The number of social peers that actively use the offered bandwidth is
lower than the number of nodes, also shown in Fig. 3.13, that are offered bandwidth.
Clearly, out of the total number of social peers a node might have—as shown in
Fig 3.2—only a very small percentage of those peers would need to be online to allow
SocialSwarm to be effective.
3.6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we introduced SocialSwarm, a novel approach to flash file dis-
semination that exploits SocialDistance, which we extract from altruism between
social peers, so as to relax the required, but inefficient, reservation of bandwidth
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Figure 3.13. Bandwidth Allocation and Social Unchokes
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to the libtorrent library, applied a social network topology and interaction history
obtained from Facebook, and evaluated it on a testbed of 500 independent virtual
clients. We showed that SocialSwarm reduces average file download time by 25% to
35% compared to that of standard BitTorrent under varied conditions—file sizes, max
SocialDistance, and leech and seed counts.
In the future, we will investigate the effect of socially enabled leeches on Social-
Swarm. Given that malicious code commonly uses social networks for propagation,
clusters of social peers have the possibility of becoming infected. Our future work
will also include finding a dynamic way to modify peer SocialDistance/altruism levels
based on observed behavior between individual peers as well as among clusters of
social peers.
SocialSwarm is a single application that was designed and implemented to directly
use SocialDistance. Developing social relationship analysis and peer identification into
individual applications such as SocialSwarm is not as efficient as leveraging a common
framework for such functions. In the next chapter, we evaluate F3DS by using it to
implement F3AV—a novel social network based distributed malware detection system.
The results of our evaluation of F3AV are also found in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4
LEVERAGING F3DS FOR DISTRIBUTED
MALWARE DETECTION IN F3AV: F3DS
ANTIVIRUS
4.1 Introduction
To demonstrate the applicability and value of F3DS, we leverage it to design,
implement, and evaluate F3AV (F3DS Antivirus), a novel N-version distributed mal-
ware detection system. F3AV provides collaborative malware detection among social
peers with the greatest levels or protection being provided to security-critical social
hubs [17]—the most social users on the network, which are the most likely to prop-
agate large quantities of malware when infected by socially aware malware1. Using
F3AV we present and evaluate a novel method for varying the required diversity
of virus scanners based on the age of the object being scanned so as to achieve a
balance between high rates of malware detection and object scanning latency. Our
evaluation using the Amazon Cloud shows that by concurrently leveraging diverse
scanners across a social network, a user can achieve a 65% increase in the detection
rate of 0- to 1-day-old malware as compared to the average detection rate of individual
scanners. Our implementation of F3AV on top of F3DS is publicly available on the
F3DS web site [18].
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of
the F3AV design. The implementation of F3AV is detailed in Section 4.3. We evaluate
F3AV using the Amazon EC2 cloud and provide the results in Section 4.4. Section 4.5
1Malware that propagates itself over social networks
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gives an overview of related work. We provide our conclusions and delineate candidate
areas of future work in Section 4.6.
4.2 F3AV Malware Detection System
Although F3DS can be used for applications in a variety of categories, we choose
to demonstrate F3DS by applying it to malware detection, one of the key areas in
the critical and challenging field of distributed system security. We build upon and
contribute to the body of research on malware detection by enabling collaboration
among social peers to detect malware.
4.2.1 The Challenge of Socially Aware Malware
Current malware is commonly designed to exploit existing altruism among social
peers for malicious purposes. For example, malware running on compromised nodes
uses altruism on social networks for self propagation in order to exploit CPU, memory,
and bandwidth resources of social network participants. The creators of malware, rec-
ognizing the rise in popularity of social applications, have continuously tuned Botnet
malware propagation and identity hijacking mechanisms to exploit trust among social
network users. For instance, Facebook users are more willing to open a message with
malicious links if that message was sent from a compromised account of a social peer.
Users commonly are less vigilant with security while interacting with social peers.
Security experts have claimed [55] [56] that cyber-espionage and social networking
attacks are the top cyber security issues of 2012. The growth of malicious software
that propagates overs social links has prompted security researchers to study methods
for protecting social hubs. Zhu et al. found [17] that when new malicious code
enters a social network, it commonly infects hub nodes—nodes with higher degrees
of connectivity and malware exposure—more quickly than those users with relatively
few social peers. Securing systems against malware—especially social hubs—have
become critical areas of security research.
4.2.2 Motivation for F3AV
With their work on Cloud-AV [57], Oberheide et. al have shown the benefits
of utilizing a cluster of servers running a heterogeneous set of antivirus software
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(with their respective signature sets). This is referred to as N-version virus scanning.
The authors show that although the antivirus signature sets used by diverse vendors
intersect, there is no single signature set that can effectively act as a superset of all
other vendor signatures. Individual AV (antivirus) products have the potential to be
compromised [58]. This provides motivation for using divergent signature sets and AV
products to scan for malware. Individual home and small office users rarely have the
budget or technical expertise to construct and maintain a cluster of N-version virus
scanners, but users commonly have social peers that are willing to share resources
(CPU, memory, bandwidth, etc). In many cases, a user’s social peers run diverse
antivirus scan engines and signature sets.
F3DS provides a means by which users can effectively share their resources and
service requests from peers. We choose to evaluate the benefits of F3DS by implement-
ing F3AV, an N-version distributed virus scanning application. An overview of F3AV
is shown in Fig. 4.1. F3AV provides two important services: first, passive sharing
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Figure 4.1. F3AV Overview
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of the result of object scans among social peers; and second, providing a medium
by which social peers can request immediate scans of particular objects; F3AV has
the goal of improving malware detection accuracy while minimizing additional object
scanning latency as described below.
4.2.3 Malware Detection Accuracy
By using the FSB services of F3DS, F3AV is designed to improve a node’s accuracy
in detecting malware from objects requested by the user. Utilizing the same N-version
philosophy of the Cloud-AV [57] project, we design F3AV to increase the malware de-
tection accuracy of individual nodes by encouraging the sharing of scan results among
social peers running diverse virus scanners. With the level of resource sharing—i.e.,
servicing scan requests and sharing results—governed by levels of altruism among
social peers, the FSB allows F3AV to maximize the antivirus resources of social-hubs.
As the recipients of larger amounts of scanning resources, social-hubs will be armed
with the highest levels of protection against malware.
4.2.4 Object Scanning Latency
By using the FSB services of F3DS, we design F3AV to minimize any latency
penalty created by relying on social peers to assist with malware detection. In
contrast with Cloud-AV, which relies on a dedicated local cluster of scanning hardware
and software, F3AV relies on the sharing of surplus memory, bandwidth, and CPU
resources across geographically dispersed nodes. Given the unpredictable availability
of social peer resources as well as the lack of guarantees on the level of willingness of
a peer to service scan requests, we design F3AV with a no-assurances approach as to
scan request response times from peers.
4.2.5 Active Scan Requests
F3AV places all of its scanning logic into a central module called DecisionHandler.
This module can be replaced or tuned given the preferences of the system user.
The DecisionHandler module is able to use the FSB to promulgate scan requests
by SocialCast to all social peers within a given Social Distance or to send unicast
scan requests to specific peers. When a prioritized request is received from the FSB
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of F3DS, F3AV will service that request and send a response message to the requester
containing the scan results, information on the scan vendor, and the date/time stamp
of the scanner signature set used.
4.2.6 Passive Scan Experience Sharing
Over time, a node will accumulate scan results from both local user requests as
well as active scan requests from peers. Scan results are stored in a local database
table of scans. A node will also store the results in a quickly searchable hash table
known as a Scan Log. The hash table key for one entry in the Scan Log is the SHA256
hash of: (URL + log creator ID + a nonce for the Scan Log). The hash table key for
a second entry in the Scan Log is the SHA256 hash of: (file contents + log creator
ID + a nonce for the Scan Log). The value for both entries in the hash table is the
scan result with a 0 indicating the object was found to be benign and a 1 indicating
the object was found to be malicious. The nonce associated with a Scan Log is part
of the Scan Log metadata that is sent to peers along with the Scan Log. Peers thus
can look up arbitrary URLs and objects in the Scan Log using the same nonce.
Both of these keys are also added to a Bloom Filter known as a Scan Digest. The
Scan Digest contains an entry if the object has been scanned and the result stored
in the Scan Log. The motivation for using a Bloom Filter to preshare information
on URLs comes from Cache Digests [59] [60] which are widely used among caching
HTTP proxy servers to identify peer proxy server contents. As with Cache Digests,
Scan Digests are small in size compared with a full list of URLs such as the Scan
Log. Scan Digests are small enough to reside in ram, whereas larger Scan Logs would
typically reside on disk. Given the possibility of Bloom Filter collisions, Scan Digests
may contain false positives, Scan Digests are always used in conjunction with Scan
Logs. Scan Digests may be viewed as a manifest of the Scan Log keys with lossy
compression.
We now describe the method used by F3AV for Scan Digest and Scan Log rotation,
sharing, and eviction. Scan Digests by their nature do not allow existing entries to
be deleted. Individual entries within a Bloom Filter do not contain semantic data
about when the scans were conducted, what scan engine was used, and the date of
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the signature set used. We design F3AV Scan Digests to include scanner vendor
and signature set information as accompanying metadata. Thus, Scan Digests and
Scan Logs must be rotated at least each time these metadata change (e.g., when the
scanner signature set is updated). To maintain a steady flow of new information on
objects to social peers, Scan Digests and Scan Logs may be rotated several times each
day. When Scan Digests and Scan Logs are rotated, the current “active write” pair
of a Scan Digest and a Scan Log are closed and a new Scan Digest and a new Scan
Log are opened for writing.
At the time of rotation, F3AV places the Scan Log in a hidden (retrievable but
not searchable) location on a locally running web service provided by the FSB. F3AV
then uses the FSB to send a Socialcast to trusted peers with the following pieces of
information:
• The URL of the new Scan Log
• The Scan Digest associated with the Scan Log
• Metadata such as the scan engine that was used, the signature set that was
used, and the date/time of the rotation creation.
Peers that receive this notice—over their FSB—retrieve the associated Scan Log
when and if their F3AV instance so chooses. F3AV appraises the potential value of a
peer’s announced Scan Log by evaluating the perceived Social Distance to the creator
of the Scan Log with Scan Logs generated by closer peers being considered as more
reliable and valuable. Peers may also compare their own recent access history with
the contents of the Scan Digest. Should the peer have a close-enough perceived Social
Distance and should the Scan Digest indicate a sufficient level of correlated access
history, F3AV will retrieve the full Scan Log associated with that Scan Digest.
When F3AV is queried to evaluate whether an object is malicious or not, it will
first identify any scanning experiences for the object that it has already received
from its social peers in the way of Scan Logs. Scan Digests are sufficiently small
to be cached in ram, whereas larger Scan Logs are more suitably stored on slower
and lower cost media. For this reason, F3AV will first perform a lightweight search
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of each memory-resident Scan Digest looking for the particular URL. If the URL is
found in a particular Scan Digest, then F3AV will proceed to search for an entry in
the disk-based Scan Log. Given the basic nature of hashtables, the Scan Log search
is a O(log n) operation. If a value is found during the look up, then this value is the
scan result claimed by the peer who performed the scanning. Scan result values that
are found are passed to the DecisionHandler (described in Section 4.2.7). If no value
is found during the hash table look up, then a Bloom Filter collision has occurred in
the Scan Digest and no result is considered. The process of creating, sharing, and
using Scan Digests and Scan Logs can be seen in Fig. 4.2.
Over time, a node will accumulate a variety of different Scan Digests and Scan
Logs from both close and distant social peers. Each Scan Digest and Scan Log will
eventually need to be evicted. To assist in Scan Digest and Scan Log eviction, F3AV
maintains a maximum age limit for both Scan Digests and Scan Logs. Once a Scan
Digest and Scan Log pair exceeds this age, the pair is automatically evicted. F3AV
also keeps an EWMA utility rating for each Scan Digest and Scan Log based on the
number of objects of interest that were found in a particular Scan Digest and Scan Log
over a given time period. Scan Digests and Scan Logs with the lowest utility rating
(those with the fewest objects of interest to the evaluator) are chosen as candidates for
eviction, should disk- or ram-cache capacity limits mandate evictions. Eviction based
on a utility rating will automatically bias the F3AV cache towards retaining objects
from neighbors who are accessing similar content—those with correlated object-access
behaviors. The greater the correlation of the objects accessed among peers the higher
the probability will be that Scan Digests and Scan Logs received by a node from its
peers will already contain scan results of value to that node.
4.2.7 Modular Scanning Logic
Fig. 4.3 shows the states used when an object request is passed through F3AV. At
the core of F3AV is a DecisionHandler module that contains the majority of the logic
around how much data are collected to make a decision as well as the result of the
decision. F3AV provides the DecisionHandler module all of the available data on the
particular object that is being requested, including all result records of previous local
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Figure 4.2. F3AV Experience Sharing
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Figure 4.3. F3AV State
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scans, peer scans found in Scan Logs, as well as peer scans obtained from directed
scan requests. Along with each of the scan records, the DecisionHandler is provided
with the scan engine name and date of signature set that created the scan results.
The DecisionHandler returns the six data structures shown in Table 4.1.
DecisionHandler is thus provided with all possible information on an object and
has full control over the behavior of F3AV. DecisionHandler can decide to make an
immediate decision (isConfident == True) and either accept or reject the object.
Alternatively DecisionHandler can decide to seek more information and specify a
list of peers or a socialcast distance to send out active scan requests. There is a
maximum decision delay time, however, and if the DecisionHandler call loop exceeds
this maximum time, then the latest return value of isMalcious is used to either accept
or reject the object.
4.2.8 Privacy Considerations
The target user set for F3AV are those who have an existing willingness to relax
their privacy requirements when collaborating with trusted and monitored social
peers. The two primary areas of concern for privacy for F3AV users are those of
Table 4.1. F3AV Parameters
PARAMETER PURPOSE
isConfident Boolean indicating whether or not
DecisionHandler is confident in its decision.
If it is not confident yet in its
decision, then it will loop and wait
for additional data to be collected.
isMalicious Boolean indicating the current decision
by DecisionHandler
(True=Malicious, False=Benign)
WaitTime Number of uSeconds to sleep before calling
DecisionHandler again if Confident ==False
doLocalScan Boolean indicating whether a local
scan should be performed on the object
ScanRequestRadius Maximum Social Distance to which F3AV
should send directed scan requests
(via a FSB-based SocialCast)
ScanRequestPeers List of specific Social Peers to which
should send directed scan requests
(via FSB-based unicast)
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clickstream (object access sequences) and antivirus (vendor/version) privacy. There
are a variety of potential methods—such as anonymous group multicast [61] among
social peers—which F3DS could offer to applications to help address these concerns.
We plan on evaluating such methods as part of our future work.
4.3 F3AV Implementation
In this section, we describe our F3AV implementation on top of F3DS. We publish
our implementation of F3AV on the F3DS web site [18].
4.3.1 Messaging
F3AV uses the f2f messaging provided by the FSB of F3DS for active scan requests
and responses, scan result confirmation requests and responses, as well as Scan Digest
messages. To distribute Scan Digests, F3AV uses the FSB to send a socialcast
containing the Scan Digest, the URL of the associated Scan Log, and the metadata
for the Scan Digest. F3AV obtains information on the scan engines and signature
sets used by peers from the Scan Digest metadata received from each peer.
4.3.2 DecisionHandler Modules
For the purpose of our evaluation, we create three interchangeable scanning logic
(DecisionHandler) modules: local-only scanning, paranoid, and dynamic. We now
describe each of these modules:
First, the local-only F3AV DecisionHandler behaves like a traditional single scan-
ner client. This module is designed only for comparison with other DecisionHandler
modules.
Second, the Paranoid F3AV DecisionHandler requires virus scan results from a
tunable minimum number of diverse scanners—within a tunable social radius. Each
of those scanners must have been updated within specific recent windows of time to
be considered valid. Lack of sufficient result diversity as well as any single positive
(malicious) result induces the Paranoid F3AV DecisionHandler module to block the
object being requested. Intuitively, this module will likely yield the highest malware
detection rates but will also require the greatest latency to certify benign objects.
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Third, the Dynamic F3AV DecisionHandler module adjusts the required diversity
of scanners based on the age of the object. The results of our experimentation as well
as those of other researchers [57] show that as malicious objects age, their probability
of being detected by one or more virus scanners increases. Protecting systems against
recent malware can also be challenging given that new malware commonly attempts to
exploit newly exposed and not-yet-patched software vulnerabilities. Software vendors
attempt to patch such vulnerabilities quickly [62], but windows of exposure frequently
exist. Although it is impossible to certify the age of objects from arbitrary sites on the
Internet, there are certain software-as-a-service (SaaS) sites which may be considered
trustworthy keepers of user submitted object upload and modification times. With
the assumption that an object’s age can be assessed with a high level of accuracy
from a list of trusted sites via the last − modified header of HTTP, the Dynamic
F3AV DecisionHandler module dynamically adjusts the required diversity of scanners
based on an object’s age. Using the last − modified HTTP header to determine
the minimum age of an abject implies that the security of a SaaS application can
be trusted to prevent date/time stamp modifications by application users of user
submitted content.
4.3.3 AV Local Scan Handlers
An F3AV module known as the local scan handler is responsible for interacting
with the antivirus scanner installed on the machine. The local scan handler retrieves
a URL, scans it with a specific antivirus engine, and returns the result to F3AV.
The local scan handler also returns information on the virus signature set used in
the scanning. For our F3AV implementation, we implement scan handler modules for
antivirus packages from the following six vendors: AVG, Avast, Microsoft, Clamwin,
Avira, and Kaspersky. Based on existing research [63] on worldwide market share of
scanning engines, we believe this set of engines represents around 65% of the global
install base of antivirus software.
4.3.4 Browser Request Filtering
To maximize compatibility with a variety of desktop and mobile user agents
(browsers), we implement an F3AV module for the squid caching http proxy server.
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Applications that make outgoing http requests via squid automatically receive the
scanning benefits of F3AV. As part of the implementation, we confirm compatibility
with three locally installed browsers (IE, Firefox, and Chrome) as well as three mobile
browsers (Opera, Firefox, and Android Browser) by configuring the mobile device to
proxy http connections through an F3AV enabled squid instance.
4.4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate F3AV via both experimentation and simulation. We
also evaluate the effectiveness of F3AV at providing the most protection to Social
Hubs to reduce the probability they will become infected and serve as valuable
launch locations for malware propagation. Due to limited space, any experimentation
details—including specific parameters used for each of the various various experiment
and simulation runs—are deferred to a longer version of this paper.
4.4.1 Malware Detection Accuracy
Using experimentation, we evaluate F3AV against its design goal of increasing
malware detection accuracy by exploiting the functionality of F3DS to allow peers
access to diverse scanning of objects. Given that the ratio of false negatives to false
positives in signature-based commercial virus scanners is several orders of magnitude,
our current experiments focus on rates of false negatives; we evaluate the detection
rate of objects that have been verified to be malware (false negatives).
4.4.1.1 Malware repository. Malware is continuously changing and adapt-
ing in attempts to avoid security software signature sets. The authors of Cloud-AV
have shown through experimentation that the older the piece of malware, the higher
the probability is that it will be caught by a given antivirus signature set. For the
purpose of evaluating F3AV, we choose to collect a large body of real malware from
the Internet [64] and update this collection daily with newly discovered malicious
code. We index each malware object using the SHA256 hash of the object’s contents.
Using a hash of each malware object’s contents allows us to ensure that we are only
storing a single copy of each given malware sample, even if that object is found in
multiple locations on the Internet. Over the course of 150 days spanning from late
66
2011 into spring of 2012, we collected over 215,000 unique pieces of live malware from
the Internet (more than 60GB of contents).
4.4.1.2 Local vs F3AV. Using the local DecisionHandler, we run each of
six individual scanners through a random selection of approximately 3000 pieces of
malware. We find similar results as found by Oberheide et al. [57] in that older
objects had a higher probability of being detected by malware scanners. Fig. 4.4
shows the individual scanner results in relation to the age of the malware object
being scanned as well as a weighted mean for those scans, with the weight based
on the proportional global market share [63] of each scanner. The weighted mean
provides a strong indication of the total effectiveness of populations at detecting
malware based on the age of the object scanned. Fig. 4.4 also shows the results of the
Paranoid and the Dynamic DecisionHandlers in F3AV. The Paranoid DecisionHandler
uses collaboration with social peers and in this experiment requires responses from
each of the six diverse scanners before a decision to allow the object is made. The
Dynamic DecisionHandler also uses collaboration with social peers but varies the
number of required responses based on the age of the object being scanned. For 0-
to 1-day-old malware, this figure highlights a 44% to 74% change (a 65% increase)
in the malware detection accuracy when using the Paranoid and Dynamic Decision
handlers in comparison with the market-share average of individual scan results.
4.4.2 Object Scanning Latency
Even though diverse scans across peers occur in parallel, the aggregation of results
in F3AV requires additional latency for communication overhead. We compare the
mean, max, and average latency required across the local scanners with those required
by the Paranoid DecisionHandlers. We also test at three different levels of a priori
object access and Scan Digest/Log sharing (locality) by peers: 0, 50, and 100%. At
the 100% level, each of the peers has already accessed an object, scanned it, and
shared the result with the inquiring peer via passive Scan Digest/Log sharing. At the
50% level, half of the URLs have previously been scanned with their results shared
and the other half are new/distinct to all of the peers in the system.
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Figure 4.5. Latency vs Object Access Locality
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requires the most time due to the real-time communication and collaboration that
must happen between the different nodes. With 100% object access/scan locality,
the Paranoid DecisionHandler clearly outperforms even the local scans due to the
fact that with 100% object access/scan locality, F3AV is able to avoid local scans by
relying exclusively on previously collected information from peers. For the purpose of
this evaluation, we only provide the extremes and do not attempt to approximate or
predict levels of object access locality among peers within real-world social networks.
Fig. 4.6 shows that the Dynamic DecisionHandler requires the greatest scan times
for the newest objects. As objects age, the Dynamic DecisionHandler decreases
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Figure 4.6. Latency vs Object Age
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decreases. Though our current Dynamic DecisionHandler experiments only use a 0%
object access locality, we expect that testing of greater than 0% object access locality
would reduce the scan times proportionally with those results from the Paranoid
DecisionHandler because of the passive scan experience caching and sharing within
F3AV.
4.4.3 Scanner Availability and Diversity
We evaluate the effectiveness of F3AV at providing significant scanner diversity to
all F3AV participants. We also measure the effective of F3AV at delivering the highest
level of protection to Social Hubs to reduce the probability they will become infected
and subsequently serve as valuable launch locations for social malware propagation.
Our implementation of F3AV supports social relationship analysis modules for
Twitter, Facebook, and email. To evaluate the potential benefit real social network
users would have when using F3AV, we conduct simulations by using real-world
social connectivity metadata extracted from Facebook. We take an anonymized
data set of real-world interactions—wall postings—from a network of 5,000 Facebook
users [49] and feed that data through the Facebook peer relationship analysis module
in F3DS to identify the nominal SocialDistance between each pair of social peers. We
repeat several of our simulations while varying the Social Net Radius—the maximum
SocialDistance whereby a peer will consider another node part of its social network
and be willing to share resources with that node.
4.4.3.1 Diverse scanner availability. The social relationships derived from
Facebook are fed into an F3AV simulator. We assign each of the 5,000 social peers
a social identity. For each Social Net Radius tested, we perform 100 simulation
runs. On each simulation run, we randomly assign each of the 5,000 social peers an
antimalware scanner from a pool of 21 candidate scanners based on the proportional
world-wide market share of each scanner. These 21 scanners represent 80% of the
global market share for antimalware software. In our simulations, we do not consider
the geographic distribution of social network users or variances in regional market
share of antimalware software; we leave such considerations to future work.
After assigning each social peer an antimalware scanner, we then evaluate the
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level of scanner diversity that exists within each peers social network and extract the
mean diversity level for each peer across the 100 simulation runs. Fig. 4.7 provides a
CDF for each of the tested Social Net Radius values and shows that even for smaller
Social Net Radius values, most peers have access to significant diversity of scanners
across their social peers. These findings also imply that even if a significant portion of
a user’s social peers were oﬄine, unwilling, or unable to share resources, there would
still be sufficient peers online and available to supply a high diversity of scanners.
4.4.3.2 SocialHub protection – scanner diversity. Fig. 4.8 compares the
level of scanner diversity available to three different sub groups of nodes: The top
250 nodes (95th percentile), the median 250 nodes, and the bottom 250 nodes (5th
percentile) with respect to social connectivity. Fig. 4.8 clearly shows that F3AV
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Figure 4.8. Scanner Diversity Availability by Social Connectivity
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4.4.3.3 SocialHub protection – Scan Digests/Logs. We also run a sim-
ulation whereby every hour, each peer in the system offers a single Scan Digest/Log
pair to one of its peers. The Scan Digest/Log offers are probabilistically granted
based on the proportion of altruism a peer has towards each of its peers. We run the
simulation for 500 virtual hours and sum up the total Scan Digest/Logs received by
each node. Fig. 4.9 shows three CDF lines—one for each of the same 95th percentile,
median, and 5th percentile 250 node peer sets used in the previous simulation. This
figure clearly shows that the most socially connected peers are the recipients of the
Scan Digest/Log offers and thus, they have access to more cached scan results in
comparison with peers that have a lower social connectivity.
These results show that, as designed, F3AV properly prioritizes allocation of
resources—including scan results sharing and availability of diverse scanners—among
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Figure 4.9. Scan Digest/Log offers by Social Connectivity
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4.5 Related Work
For malware detection and isolation on distributed devices, researchers have pro-
posed a variety [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] of methods based around the basic principle
of workload oﬄoading to a cloud-based service. F3AV is complementary to these
approaches in that it provides a decentralized service based on existing resources
among social peers for servicing scanning requests.
4.6 Conclusions and Future Work
To demonstrate the value of F3DS, we designed and implemented a novel malware
detection application—F3AV (F3DS antivirus)—on top of F3DS and found that with
f2f sharing of resources F3AV significantly enhances the ability of social peers to detect
malware. We also showed that F3AV provides greatly enhanced malware protection
to social hubs by ensuring that they receive the most Scan Digest/Log offers and have
access to the greatest diversity of scanner engines.
Other areas of potential future research include enhancing F3AV with additional
and more complex DecisionHandlers, evaluating the resilience of F3DS-enabled appli-
cations to both innocuous and malicious peer misbehavior, and investigating execution-
based malware detection.
F3DS lacks sharing of detected peer behavior—be that proper peer behavior or
misbehavior–among peers. We envision that F3DS could be enhanced to share peer
behavior information among social network participants.
In the next chapter, we present novel method for establishing trust among dis-
tributed system participents based exclusively on monitoring of peer behavior and
sharing of peer behavior information among peers. Such a system could be used in
the future to enhance F3DS.
CHAPTER 5
STATISTICAL TRUST ESTABLISHMENT
IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
We present a new distributed approach that establishes reputation-based trust
among sensor nodes in order to identify malfunctioning and malicious sensor nodes
and minimize their impact on applications. Our method adapts well to the special
characteristics of wireless sensor networks, the most important being their resource
limitations. Our methodology computes statistical trust and a confidence interval
around the trust based on direct and indirect experiences of sensor node behavior. By
considering the trust confidence interval, we are able to study the tradeoff between
the tightness of the trust confidence interval with the resources used in collecting
experiences. Furthermore, our approach allows dynamic scaling of redundancy levels
based on the trust relationship between the nodes of a wireless sensor network. Using
extensive simulations, we demonstrate the benefits of our approach over an approach
that uses static redundancy levels in terms of reduced energy consumption and longer
life of the network. We also find that high confidence trust can be computed on each
node with a relatively small memory overhead and used to determine the level of
redundancy operations among nodes in the system.
5.1 Introduction
Due to the criticality of many WSN applications, including monitoring and early
warning systems, it is crucial that the information obtained from these networks be
trustworthy. Decisions based on the sensor network data can have serious economic
and social impact. Therefore, nodes in a sensor network must perform their functions
reliably. However, due to their limited capabilities for economic viability, deployment
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in “unfriendly” physical environments, and risk of physical attacks, not all sensor
nodes can be expected to behave reliably at all times [70]. It then becomes necessary
to identify malfunctioning and malicious or compromised nodes, and isolate them.
Detecting such misbehaving nodes from a location external to the network is difficult.
This is because sensor nodes perform in-network data processing and aggregation.
Wireless sensor networks can be secured most effectively against misbehaving nodes if
the nodes closest to the source of the problem themselves can detect such misbehavior
and react accordingly.
Currently, to deal with node misbehavior, critical sensor network deployments re-
quire sufficient redundancy to meet the needs of the particular application. However,
complete redundancy typically requires a minimum of triple the amount of hardware
(and energy expenditures) to ensure that a 2/3 Byzantine consensus can be achieved
when a sensing or aggregation discrepancy is encountered. Such full redundancy has
traditionally required a constant level of energy expenditure irrespective of network
threat and misbehavior levels.
Wireless sensor networks must protect themselves from a variety of threats. In
WSNs, typically, a large number of sensors are deployed in some area of interest.
These sensor nodes are expected to work unattended even in naturally harsh physical
conditions. They are also often deployed in accessible areas where they could be
physically attacked. The harsh physical conditions, or physical attacks, could result
in malfunctioning of the sensor devices. Sensor nodes could also be compromised by
tampering, and replicated. Additionally, malicious sensor nodes could be dropped
into the area of deployment. These malicious sensors could eavesdrop on sensor
communications, pose as legitimate nodes, disrupt the functioning of the sensor
networks by imposing themselves as “nodes-in-the-middle”, and disrupting service
in a variety of ways. We have loosely classified the different types of misbehaviors in
a WSN below. This classification is not intended to be comprehensive. Our goal here
is to identify the type of misbehavior our research has targeted.
• Misbehavior 1: Sensor nodes malfunction but are not malicious.
• Misbehavior 2: Malicious attacker nodes (possibly dropped in the sensor field)
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eavesdrop on communications between genuine nodes, impersonate genuine
nodes, and generate denial-of-service traffic or signals. However, in this threat
model, there are no compromised nodes.
• Misbehavior 3: Compromised nodes, although appearing to be genuine, mal-
function maliciously. They are also likely to cause the second type of misbe-
havior.
Our research focuses on misbehavior 1. We have established a trust system in sen-
sor networks where nodes could malfunction but are not malicious. However, our trust
system can also be a useful component for any solution that addresses misbehavior
3. This is because a compromised node might be able to authenticate itself correctly
and still malfunction maliciously. Our trust system detects malfunctioning, whether
malicious or not. Our research, however, does not address misbehavior 2, which
requires suitable authentication and privacy mechanisms. In addressing misbehavior
1, we have focused on the following three basic functions of WSNs - accurate data
collection, data routing, and data processing and aggregation. In this chapter, we
present a new distributed approach that establishes reputation-based trust among
sensor nodes that allows the system to dynamically adapt its redundancy based on
the confidence that nodes have between each other to behave correctly (trust). We
show that a significant amount of energy can be conserved and the sensor network life
extended when redundancy is varied according to the changing levels of trust between
nodes.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 summarizes
existing work on building trust. Section 5.3 describes our trust system, its various
components, and our trust computation methodology. In Section 5.4, we evaluate our
trust model and in Section 5.5, we present conclusions and potential future areas of
research.
5.2 Related Work
Trust has been studied in a variety of networks and applications. A large number
of trust models have been proposed in social networking. In this section, we review
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only those existing works that are somewhat related to our research. Golbeck and
Hendler [71] extend the concept of the semantic web to include reputation ratings.
The algorithm they present is based on voting to derive either a complete trust or
complete lack of trust in an entity. No partial trust is derived with their algorithm.
They do not account for history of interactions and they assume perfect connectivity.
There is no discussion of how to cache reputation ratings. Cahill et al. have outlined
the importance of considering both risk as well as trust when making decisions [72]. If
risk is low, then the action threshold for trust can be low. The trust model component
of our research is based on the hypothesis of Carbone et al., which introduces a model
that takes uncertainty into account. Caching trust is discussed in [73] but only to the
extent of caching ciphers. Cache eviction based on content is not discussed. Gray
et al. introduce the importance of calculating trust based on the “Small Worlds”
approach [74]. They recommend a cache eviction algorithm also based on a “Small
Worlds” approach. Reputation-based trust has also been proposed for peer-to-peer
systems. Ganeriwal et al. present a Bayesian-based approach for building WSN
trust [75]. Bayesian methods, though memory efficient, are not suitable for delay-
tolerant networks where significantly stale information may arrive at the same time
as fresh information. Chen and Yeager have constructed a decentralized trust system
for the Sun JXTA platform [76]. They also take a Bayesian approach and use discrete
trust ratings which cannot provide the same level of accuracy as continuous trust
ratings. The confidence levels that they propose are not based on statistical confidence
intervals. Although the above existing research addresses the problem of trust, none
looks at building trust specific to resource-limited and delay-tolerant wireless sensor
networks. Theodorakopoulos and Baras in [77] present an algorithm for forming trust
in Ad Hoc networks based on seminirings. This approach, however, lacks the ability
to easily decay the usefulness of previous experiences based on the risk sensitivity
(aversion level) of each node independent of other nodes. Our method for trust
calculation allows each node in a system to independently evaluate and weigh the
experiences of other nodes without reliance on summarized recommendations of other
nodes. Avinash et al. in [78] present a reputation-based system that precludes the
ability for nodes to perform their own assessment of original experience evidence.
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Their system is also delay in-tolerant. Yu et al. in [79] present an information
theoretic framework for trust evaluation. Their framework along with the work of
Kraniewski et al. in TIBFIT [80] do not leverage statistical confidence intervals
nor do they address energy consumption optimizations. There is also a growing
amount of research on security in WSNs (e.g., [81, 70, 82, 83, 84, 85]. This research
mainly addresses misbehavior 2, and to some extent misbehavior 3, as described
in Section 5.1. Unlike this existing research, our focus is on building trust in the
presence of malfunctioning nodes while reducing energy consumption. Trust is not a
replacement for security nor is security a replacement for trust. Trust and security
rather complement each other. Within a system, building trust may require the use
of secure protocols and maintaining security may be aided by trust establishment and
maintenance.
5.3 Trust System
Social networks serve as an example by which we created a trust model for
wireless sensor networks. Social trust is built in two phases. Before we directly
interact with an individual, we might postulate a preconceived level of trust in that
individual. Preconceived trust is formed from evidence we are given from other
individuals in our social network. We automatically discount the accuracy of the
obtained information based on our trust in the individuals who are generating and
passing the information. We tend to trust information received via our direct social
peers more than information received from the second layer of our social peers. The
second phase of building trust is to interact directly with the individual or observe
the direct interaction of others with the individual and start to establish a history of
trust with that individual. In the case of WSNs, these observations to the sensing,
routing and aggregation behavior of other nodes may be made by overhearing the
radio communications of these nodes.
5.3.1 Context-specific Trust
Social trust in relationships may be built over days, months, years, or even decades.
Each individual might have a different valuation of trust built over time. Earning trust
80
may take a different length of time depending on the circumstances. Again, the trust
we form with other individuals is limited to specific contexts based on the interaction
we have had with them. Typically, we do not trust our preferred automobile mechanic
with legal questions nor do we trust our preferred lawyer with questions regarding
fuel injection systems.
Following the social network model, we have postulated that, given a network
of context-specific and directional-trust relationships connecting two entities, any
entity can place a confidence rating on any piece of data/fact/statement generated
by another entity that falls within the given context. In the case of WSNs, the data
produced by other nodes can be sensor readings, routed data, or aggregated data.
We have further presumed that a confidence interval about the trust rating may be
established to allow the entities to make accurate decisions. In the case of WSNs,
this confidence interval will assist nodes in making decisions for routing, sensing,
and data aggregation. Data should not be routed through nodes that can not be
trusted. Likewise, data collected from a misbehaving node or routed or aggregated
through should not be propagated through the network. Nodes may need to expend
more power sensing to take over for a neighbor node whose sensors can no longer
be trusted. Nodes should not include sensor readings in aggregation processing from
nodes that cannot be trusted to provide generally accurate readings.
5.3.2 Collection of Experiences
We describe four types of experiences below. For each type of experience, we list
the methodology we used to enable a node to turn the experience into a useful piece
of information.
5.3.2.1 Sensor readings. Nodes follow the process of overhearing sensor read-
ings of nearby nodes and then comparing them to their local sensor readings. If the
remote sensor readings are correlated closely enough with the local sensor readings
(they are within a threshold set by decaying the correlation of values based on the
distance between the sensor ranges), then the remote sensor reading is considered to be
valid. Overhearing the source node of sensor readings is not the only way to evaluate
a sensor reading. Intermediary nodes that have been requested to route raw sensor
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information (and their respective neighbors that can overhear them) can also evaluate
each sensor reading for accuracy, albeit with more limited ability given the increased
distance from the source nodes sensors. The greater the perceived degradation in
sensor accuracy, the less the source sensor node is trusted to accurately sense in the
near future.
5.3.2.2 Experience generation accuracy. This is the evaluation of a neigh-
bor’s accuracy in recording direct experiences. To evaluate a neighbor’s ability to
generate experiences, a node listens to experiences generated and communicated by
that neighbor and compares these experiences to its own. The larger the discrepancies
in perceptions of experiences, the less trust a node will have in its neighbor’s abil-
ity to accurately generate experiences. Examples of collection misbehavior include
improperly weighing or evaluating an experience.
5.3.2.3 Observed data propagation accuracy (routing). Neighboring nodes
within a certain proximity to a node performing some routing action are able to
overhear both the incoming packet and the outgoing packet. These neighboring
nodes can compare the outgoing routing destination of each overheard packet to its
information in its own routing tables. If the packet apparently advances toward its
intended destination, then the routing behavior of the overheard node is considered
correct. If the packet does not get routed, gets corrupted or modified, or gets routed
along an incorrect path, then the experience is recorded as a misbehavior by the
overhearing node.
5.3.2.4 Observed accuracy of data aggregation. We examined two types
of aggregation behavior observance. The first is one where a node is close enough
to a neighbor to overhear all aggregation communication (inputs and outputs). In
this case, a node will simply verify that the aggregation function behaved correctly.
The second and more complex case is where the aggregation behavior of a node is
to be evaluated for a node that is far enough away not to be able to overhear all its
inputs. In this case, we relied on nodes that can compare the result of multipath
propagation schemes for data aggregation. Examples of aggregation misbehavior
include inaccurately aggregating data due either to processor error or to intentional
bias.
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5.3.3 Trust Computation Methodology
In this section, we present our trust computation methodology using experience
records as input and providing as an output a trust value and a confidence interval
based on those experiences. We present this methodology in the context of one entity,
E1, that wishes to form trust in another entity, E2. Although a typical motivation
for trust formation between nodes is decision-making, we do not explore different
motivations here because the methodology is indifferent to motivation. Before trust
is formed, entity E1 observes the behavior of E2 and judges whether the behavior
is correct. Each opportunity E1 has of observing and judging the behavior of E2 is
recorded in an experience record. An experience record contains at a minimum the
following pieces of information:
• Identification of the entity (node) being observed. In our example, this is the
identity of E2. This may be a unique node-id, unique location, or some other
type of entity identifier.
• Identification of the entity (node) making the observation. In our example, this
is the identity of E1. This may be a digital signature. The identity of the
observer is necessary in the cases where experience records are shared between
nodes.
• The context type of the experience/observation. If, for example, E1 judges
E2’s ability to sense temperature accurately, the context of the experience
would be data sensing. In WSNs, data sensing is one important responsibility
that nodes fulfill and thus is well served by neighbor observation. Two other
important responsibilities are a) data routing, propagation and aggregation, and
b) generation of an experience record. Experience record includes E2’s ability
to observe other nodes accurately, and generate experiences itself.
• A timestamp indicating how long ago the experience took place. This infor-
mation is important given that experiences become stale over time (nodes may
change behavior in the interim).
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• The trust value. This is the actual rating of trustworthiness that the observer
(E1) assigns the node being observed (E2) for this particular experience. We
use xi to represent the trust value of experience (sample) i
• A weight that the observer (E1) assigned to the experience record indicating
the amount of observation that went into generating the experience record. A
limited or brief experience would be weighted lower than a longer lasting or
more intense experience. We use wci to represent the context specific weight
that an observer assigns to the experience i.
E1 thus observes the behavior of E2 and records these experiences in a local
experience cache. Over time, these experiences will become stale and E1 may find
it necessary to evict an existing record in the trust cache to make room for a newer
record. E1 uses this trust cache to store both experiences that it recorded itself as
well as experience records it receives from other nodes in the network.
5.3.3.1 Initial evaluation of experience records. When E1 wishes to form
a trust confidence interval for E2, it first identifies the context of the desired trust
confidence interval (ability to sense data, etc). It queries its experience cache for
records that have E2 being evaluated in this context. The goal of E1 is to find the
mean of these trust values and to identify a confidence interval about this mean. The
typical method for finding a mean (x) of the sample values is simply to add up all of




The typical method for finding a confidence interval about this mean is to first









where α is 0.10 for a 90% confidence interval, 0.05 for a 95% confidence interval,
etc. The t in the above equation represents the student − t distribution. If the
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confidence interval is sufficiently narrow (as determined by the context), E1 proceeds
with its decision-making process. However, if the confidence interval is too wide, then
additional experiences are collected at the expense of additional resources.
The above method constitutes the basis of our trust computation methodology.
Experience records may be received after a significant delay. The significance of an
event may be different between observing nodes. A node that creates an experience
may be unreliable or malicious. For these reasons, our trust system establishes a
confidence interval around a weighted mean [87, 88] to overcome this problems rather
than taking a Bayesian approach.
To create the confidence interval around a weighted mean, E1 first calculates a
weight Wi for each sample point i. It does this by combining the context specific,
level of observation weight wci with a new weight w
t
i that is based on the age of the
experience record. The formula behind wti may be chosen at the discretion of E1,
but the idea is that the older the sample point (experience record) is, the lower the
weight should be. This may be, for instance, some constant chosen from the interval






Using this total weight for each sample point E1 then determines the weighted mean

















Armed with the weighted mean xw and the weighted variance σ
2
w, E1 then forms
a confidence (eq.1) interval about the weighted mean. To reduce the effect of stale
samples and to reduce bias created by correlated samples, the tn−1,1−α/2 value is
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established not by using the usual total number of samples points (n) but instead by
using a deflated number of degrees of freedom. This deflated number of degrees of
freedom is obtained by simply adding up the sum of all of the total experience weights:
ΣWi. When all total experience weights are in the interval [0,1], the net effect of using
this deflated number for degrees of freedom is a widening of the confidence interval.
This widening is important due to the reduced confidence we have in correlated and
stale values.
5.3.3.2 Incorporating experiences collected by third parties. Although
first-hand experiences are the most valuable, it is also valuable for E1 to collect and
weigh experiences generated by neighbors of E2. To use experience data produced
by other neighbors of E2, E1 must first establish its own trust in the ability of those
neighbors to generate experiences. We will use Fig. 5.1 as an example. E3 has
generated experiences relating to E2, but until E1 has established its own trust in E3,
these experience records cannot be used by E1. E1 starts the process of establishing
E1 E2
E3
1) E3 overhears and observes E2’s behavior
3) E3 passes these experience records on to E1
4) E1 evaluates E3’s accuracy in generating 
     based on its trust in E3.
     experience records and discounts the
     experience records it receives from E3
2) E3 generates experience records
Figure 5.1. Building Trust via a Third Party
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trust in E3 by comparing experience records it (E1) has created while observing
certain sensor network/node behavior to those created by E3 for the same behavior.
In this process, E1 is able to collect experiences of E3’s ability to generate experiences.
It then calculates the confidence interval about the weighted mean of these experience
using the equations for weighted mean, weighted variance, and a deflated number of
degrees of freedom, described above. The resulting confidence interval in the context
of E3’s Experience Generation accuracy is formed by using eq.1. This confidence
interval is then transformed by E1 into a fixed point τEG3 which represents the level
of trust E1 places in E3’s ability to accurately generate experiences. τ stands for
“Trust”. The number 3 is the id of the neighbor being evaluated, and EG stands
for “Experience Generation”. Specifically, the trust level, τEG3 , is calculated based on
the following equation.
τEG3 = xw − ρ ∗ tn−1,1−α/2 ∗
√
σ2w/n (eq.2)
Here, ρ, ([−1, 1]) is the level of aversion held by E1 (the node doing the evaluation).
It identifies the risk E1 is willing to take in E3’s experience generation ability. In the
worst case, ρ = 1, implying that E3 chooses the lowest possible trust value in E3’s
experience generation ability. In the best case, ρ = −1, implying that E1 is willing
to accept the highest possible trust value in E3’s experience generation capability.
5.3.3.3 Incorporating distant observations. So far, we have covered how
a node (E1 in our example) can use experience records generated by both itself and
immediate neighbors. We will now explain how experience records generated by
nodes farther than one hop away (nondirectly connected), which can be used in this
trust system. This is experience data produced by entities that have potentially never
interacted or communicated directly with the node doing the evaluation. For example:
E1 wishes to establish a trust confidence interval about E5’s sensing accuracy. E1 is
not near enough to watch and evaluate E5. An additional entity E4, however, is near
enough to evaluate and generate experience data on E5 and it happens to be near
enough to E3 for radio communication as illustrated in Fig. 5.2. For E1 to utilize the
experience data generated by E4, experience data must be accurately generated and




1) E4 overhears and observes E5’s behavior
2) E4 generates experience records
3) E4 passes these experience records on to E3
4) E3 passes these experience records on to E1 
5) E1 calculates its trust in E4’s ability to
     accuratly generated experience records and
     E3’s ability to accurately route data. E1
     then discounts the experience records 
     generated by E4 based on this trust in 
     E4 and E3.
E5
Figure 5.2. Building Trust in a Remote Node
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experiences in the same manner as described above. However instead of directly
being able to evaluate E4, one must instead rely in experience records generated by
E3. After receiving experience records relating to E4’s ability to accurately generate
experiences, E1 combines these into a confidence interval and then in turn into a
single trust value, τEG4 , using eq.2. Likewise, E1 evaluates E3’s ability to accurately
propagate data. There may exist cases where nodes can accurately generate expe-
riences and sense data, but due to faulty (or malicious) software, fail to route and
propagate data accurately. E1 uses all of its available experience records related to
E3’s ability to propagate data and creates a confidence interval and then a single trust
value, τDP3 , also using eq.2. where τ
DP
3 in this case represents E1’s trust in E3 in the
context of “Data Propagation”. E1 then uses the trust values it has established in E4
(ability to accurately generate experiences) and E3 (ability to accurately propagate










If a certain piece of experience data must be propagated through multiple nodes,
then that piece of experience data is discounted by the evaluator’s trust in each
intermediate node to propagate the data accurately. Hence, the generic equation for












where τEGgenerator−id is the evaluators trust in the node that recorded the experience
(in the context of Experience generation) and τDProuterX is repeated for each node
through which the experience record was propagated. With this method, an evaluator
establishes trust through a chain of nodes and can use experience data generated by
distant nodes.
5.3.3.4 Initial bootstrap of the trust system. Initialization of the system
starts by nodes recording their own direct experiences with their physical neighbors.
These experiences should include the evaluation of neighbors in at least the two
special contexts of Experience-generation and Data-propagation. Each of these direct
experiences is used for calculating the trust the evaluator node has in its neighbors.
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wti is an age-based weight (described in the previous section) and w
c
i is a weight
assigned by the evaluator based on the level of contact the experience represents. For
each neighbor, the experiences in each of the above contexts are grouped together
to form a trust confidence interval in that particular context. For example, a node
wishing to form a trust confidence interval in the context of Experience-generation
for a particular neighbor will follow this protocol:
1. Observe experience data generated by the neighbor. This experience data would
be in some context other than experience generation.
2. Compare that experience data to locally generated experience data and rate
the accuracy of the experience data generation. From this comparison, a new
experience point is generated.
3. Each of these experience points are weighed based on their age and context-
weight to form a confidence interval: xw ± tn−1,1−α/2
√
σ2w/n.
5.3.3.5 Limited memory for experience data. Sensor nodes usually have
limited memory for storing experience data. If a new and apparently useful piece of
experience data is acquired and must be added to a completely full experience data
store, then an existing piece of experience data must be evicted. The eviction only
takes place if the new piece of experience data has a higher “usefulness” than a piece
of information already in the cache. We find that the resulting cache replacement
pattern is similar to the “small worlds” replacement method, as recommended in [74].
In order to gain unfair advantage, certain entities could attempt to flood all receptive
nearby entities with messages and requests for interaction in attempt to boost their
own trust rating. For this reason, entities would find it beneficial to throttle the rate
of new experiences from other entities.
5.3.3.6 Experience correlation. Our statistical methodology for computing
confidence intervals expects independent samples. If the experience data are corre-
lated, several samples must be aggregated to generate a single sample [86].
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5.3.3.7 Location awareness. Sensor nodes must have a good sense of their
environment in order to evaluate experiences such as sensor values received from
other sensor nodes. Location awareness is necessary for extrapolation of sensor
data. Typically node location is not known beforehand; thus, an in-network location
awareness system [89] must be used. The location information required for evaluating
experiences will be no more than that already required for efficiently routing and
aggregating data in a deployed WSN application. Thus, location awareness for the
purpose of trust computation should not require any additional resources.
5.3.3.8 Energy considerations. Our trust system requires sensor nodes to
“overhear” messages from neighboring sensor nodes, and also collect trust data from
the neighboring sensor nodes. We piggyback trust data on transmission and reception
of application messages wherever possible. The system may be combined with other
optimizations designed to reduce the overhead of trust formulation. An example of
one such optimization is the MIT Leach protocol [90].
5.4 Evaluation of the Trust System
Using a custom discrete event simulator, “Trust-Sensim”, we have simulated a
cluster of nodes with the ability to formulate trust between each other. Here we
describe the different aspects of this simulator.
5.4.1 Energy
Each node in the simulation has the energy consumption characteristics for trans-
mitting, receiving, and processing data as well as sleeping of a Telos Rev B WSN
node (model TPR2420CA). Each node is powered by a simulated energy capacity of
two AA batteries. At the beginning of each simulation, these batteries are given an
initial charge normally distributed around 2400 mAh (with a standard deviation of
200mAh).
5.4.2 Positioning
The nodes are positioned in relatively close proximity so as to allow for overlap
between their sensing and communication ranges. This allows for all nodes to overhear
each other’s communications and build trust based on their observations. For this
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simulation the nodes are statically positioned 5 meters apart in a square grid of NxN
nodes that act as a cluster of nodes. We simulate cluster sizes of 2x2, 3x3, 4x4, and
5x5 nodes. The 5x5 cluster having 25 nodes and an edge length of 25 meters. Nodes
are aware of each other’s identities and positions.
5.4.3 Simulation Events
As in the MIT Leach protocol [90], each node is assigned TDMA time slots for
communication with the cluster lead during each round of sensing. For each round
of sensing, each node: A) Wakes up on its assigned slot. B) Senses the current
temperature and estimated remaining battery charge. C) Transmits the readings to
the current cluster lead. D) Receives an ACK message back from the cluster lead
which may include system management information such as the identity of the next
cluster lead. E) Sleeps until the next round.
At the end of each round, the cluster-lead has the responsibility of doing a single
high power transmission of the aggregated results to the base station. Any node that
disagrees with the aggregated results can do its own high power transmission to the
base station. For this simulation, the round period was 2 hours. Each cluster lead
serves for a total of 25 rounds (50 hours) before a new cluster lead is chosen. During
the final round of a cluster lead’s tenure, the cluster lead advertises to all of the
system nodes the node identify which will serve as the next cluster lead, which is the
node with the most available remaining energy. The simulation ends when any node
in the system is fully depleted of its energy capacity.
5.4.4 Trust Formulation
Each node can enter a mode called “neighborhood watch mode” which causes
a node to first wake up at the very beginning of each round of sensing and listen
on the radio for transmission of all other nodes. After overhearing the sensing
data transmission of other nodes, the node will aggregate the data and transmit
the aggregation result to the cluster lead (and any other listening nodes). A node
will enter the low-power sleep mode at the very end of the “round” after all other
nodes have concluded their aggregated data transmissions.
Neighborhood watch mode allows the system to act in a fully redundant manner.
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All nodes not only sense and transmit the current cluster lead, but they also monitor
each other’s sensing and aggregation behavior and transmit their own aggregation
result to the current cluster lead. Each node also has the ability to enter the “trust
formulation mode” which adds the following actions onto the “neighborhood watch
mode”.
1. Evaluate the sensor readings, data aggregation results, and trust experiences
overheard from other nodes; based on this evaluation, add new experiences to
the local cache of trust experiences.
2. Communicate highly weighted experiences from the local experience cache to
neighbors that may be listening via piggy-backing trust experiences on top of
sensor reading transmissions to that node acting as the current cluster lead.
3. Probabilistically sleep and skip one or more sensing rounds based on each node’s
trust in the current cluster lead and its own neighbors.
On initial system startup, no trust exists between nodes. As nodes interact with
each other, trust is formed. Figs. 5.3 and 5.4 show the effect of varying levels of link
loss on the trust formation process. High levels of link loss prevent narrow confidence
intervals from forming and delay, though they do not prevent, the formation of a high
trust value. Nodes that are able to dedicate more memory resources to the formation
of trust are able to achieve narrower confidence intervals, as shown in Fig. 5.5. There
exists a tradeoff to the amount of memory dedicated to the formation of trust and
the level of trust achievable (and therefore the life expectancy of a network that uses
dynamic redundancy).
5.4.5 Findings
Though building trust requires more memory and computational resources than
the neighborhood watch mode alone (due to the trust cache and trust formulation
processing), the potential is created for dynamically sleeping through sensing rounds
based on current trust in other system nodes. Thus, with building trust, the potential
is created to save energy and extend the life span of the sensor network. We first
establish a baseline by comparing three different systems: A) One with no redundancy
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Figure 5.3. Effect of Link Loss on Startup Trust Level
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Figure 5.4. Effect of Link Loss on Startup Trust Confidence Interval Width
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Figure 5.5. Cache Size Effect on Startup Confidence Interval Width
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and neighbor monitoring. In this case, nodes perform only their own duties and never
attempt to overhear or monitor the communications of other nodes, including the
aggregation function performed by the base station. B) A system with full redundancy
where all nodes monitor the communications and actions of all other nodes. C) A
system with dynamic redundancy based on current levels of trust between nodes.
In this simulation, we allow each node to have a relatively large trust cache (1000
entries). Fig. 5.6 shows that the achievable life expectancy of a system with trust
enabled is well higher than a statically redundant system without trust. We ran the
simulator varying the number of nodes in the system as well as the amount of memory
dedicated to the trust cache in each system. Fig. 5.7 shows the change in expected
minimum life of the system (in hours) as the amount of memory available to the trust
cache on each node is increased. We find that full redundancy within larger networks
requires a considerably higher amount of memory on each node in order to establish
trust among nodes. Dedicating a relatively small amount of memory to each node can






















































Figure 5.6. System Life with Different Node Counts
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Figure 5.7. Cache Size Comparison
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produce a significant improvement in the life expectancy of the system. As with any
typical cache, however, there are diminishing returns associated with adding memory
to the trust cache on each node. The simulator was also used to test the reaction
time for injecting node failures into the system. At approximately 120 hours into the
simulation, after trust had been established between system nodes, a sensor failure
on one of the nodes was simulated. Fig. 5.8 shows the time required for the system to
react (the confidence interval to widen) when a node fails. This graph represents the
average trust confidence interval width in the failed node among all other nodes in
the system. It is interesting to note that larger trust caches on each node are able to
maintain narrower confidence intervals in the event of node failure. This is because
with larger caches, a higher number of new experiences are accepted into the cache
and usable in calculating trust. Though not shown here, the cluster lead is able to
react more quickly than other nodes in the system given that it is awake and thus
has one of the first available opportunities to detect node failure. Other nodes in
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Figure 5.8. Simulated Sensor Failure Reaction Time
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the system that are sleeping at the time of a node failure are unable to detect the
node misbehavior until they wake up and are informed by the cluster lead (or their
neighbors). It takes more time for the entire system to react with a higher number of
sleeping nodes. The node with the failed sensor itself may have been sleeping during
some of these hours, delaying detection by neighbors until it wakes up. A future
enhancement to the system might be to assign higher weights to experiences where
nodes behavior changes rather than give the same weight to all new experiences. Such
a change would assist in drawing the attention to sudden changes in behavior.
5.5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we presented a new distributed approach that establishes reputation-
based trust among sensor nodes in order to identify sensor node misbehavior, minimize
their impact on applications, and maximize energy conservation. We demonstrated
the benefits of our approach using extensive simulations. However, we have only tested
simple node failures and levels of link loss. We plan to investigate the responsiveness
of the trust model to malicious misbehavior, including both external attackers and
existing nodes that have been compromised. We also plan to experiment with node
mobility.
We envision that our proposed novel approach to establish trust among nodes
based on distributed monitoring, assessment, and sharing of peer behavior information
among peers can be used to enhance the capabilities of F3DS. In the next chapter, we
present the overall conclusions of this dissertation as well as ideas for future research.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In Chapters 2 through 4 of this dissertation, we have presented novel methods
that use social metrics to enhance p2p collaboration, including describing, imple-
menting, and evaluating social collaborative systems that enhance file distribution
(SocialSwarm) and malware detection (F3AV) via the novel F3DS framework.
F3AV can be incrementally improved via such varied methods as adding a ”multi-
factor” DecisionHandler that takes into account multiple factors including each peer’s
SocialDistance, the age of each signature set used, the age of each scan, the common-
ality and diversity among scan engines and signatures sets to form a combined, and
weighted confidence interval to decide whether to trust an object, to reject an object,
or to seek more scans on an object.
F3AV could also be enhanced to leverage cloud-based scanning when absolutely
necessary—when f2f scanning services are unavailable or the accuracy thereof is
questionable.
The F3DS framework that we presented and implemented can serve as a basis
for enabling social awareness in many other p2p applications. We now present three
examples of such applications—Distributed f2f backups, content distribution, and
IDS/IPS.
6.1 Other Applications of F3DS
In this section, we describe some of the other candidate applications that can be
built upon F3DS.
• Distributed f2f Backup: F3DS could be used to build a fully distributed erasure
code–based f2f backup service using capacity and bandwidth from trusted social
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peers to store as well as retrieve (when necessary) encrypted backup sets. A
goal of this system would be to dynamically adjust the encoding of backup sets
based on the availability of social peers as well as our confidence in each of
those peers to be willing and able to retain the data over the desired retention
window.
• Distributed f2f Content Cache: Social peers commonly have correlated interests
in online content [91]. F3DS could be used as the basis for a f2f-distributed
web cache that prefetches, caches, and distributes content based on correlated
content access behavior among social peers.
• Distributed f2f IDS/IPS: A significant challenge in the area of distributed intru-
sion detection [92] [93] is that of finding and maintaining sufficient diversity of
trusted nodes and resources to participate in the collection and analysis of data
on network attacks. F3DS could be used to allow f2f collaboration on attack
monitoring and analysis with the goal of protecting distributed p2p application
services from malicious entities.
6.2 Application Level Misbehavior Monitoring
In Chapter 4, we presented a statistical method for establishing trust in the
behavior of peer devices. This method can be adapted and implemented in F3DS
to allow for trust to be formed and maintained within a network of F3DS-enabled
applications using peer behavior monitoring and analysis.
Behavioral analysis can leverage both the detection of peer misbehavior as well as
the observation of sudden changes in normal behavior. The hypothesis is that if the
correlation of a peer’s object access or malware scanning patterns to those of his/her
social peers rapidly changes, then the peer may have been compromised.
In the remainder of this chapter, we present a number of open challenges related
to social networks and potential areas for future research.
6.3 Mobility
The price, weight, and energy consumption of sensors and processors on mobile
devices will continue to drop, thus permitting a continuous increase in collected
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data which will be fed to friends and followers on social networks. Under such
circumstances, the percentage of people using such mobile devices for collaboration
with their social peers will increase.
Mobile devices will continue to increase in their utility. Users will commonly use
their mobile devices to store financial data and make direct device-to-device financial
transactions. Such data will also pose as valuable targets for attack by malware
creators.
As the use of mobile devices increases, so will the use of location-aware and
environment-aware software applications also increase. The information collected
by these applications and then shared with other social network users will add to
the volume of data that must be secured and kept private. Currently, there are
races among mobile device vendors for increased sensing capabilities as well as among
mobile application developers seeking for increased simplicity in sharing data with
social peers. At the same time, little emphasis is being placed on security and privacy.
Thus, the new mobile hardware and software seem to be generating more security and
privacy problems than they are solving.
With the growth of mobile applications, the need to detect mobile malware will rise
commensurately. Given the limited resources (memory, cpu, bandwidth) of current
mobile devices, detection of sophisticated mobile and socially aware malware is a
significant challenge.
6.4 Trends in Malware
Malware is continuously increasing in sophistication. Recent techniques have
emerged to create malware by pragmatically stitching together [94] legitimate sys-
tem binaries into malicious code. Other techniques leverage GPUs to perform run
time unpacking and polymorphism [95]. Such self-camouflaging worms are almost
impossible to detect using traditional signature-based virus detection.
The processing resources required to detect this new generation of malware are
significantly higher than traditional signature-based virus detection. Some of the
proposed effective solutions include GPU-assisted antimalware [96] [97] [98], and
execution-based virus detection using lightweight virtual machines [99] [100].
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The cpu and memory available to individual users—especially those with mobile
devices—are not sufficient to scan and filter all objects that a user might access in
real time. For this reason, a valuable enhancement to F3AV would be to incorporate
GPU antimalware techniques and/or execution-based scanning so as to distribute the
computation required to scan a group of objects that are of mutual interest to a social
peers across the resources available to those peers.
IDS is another area that could benefit from distributed social peer collaboration.
Distributed IDS has long been an area of interesting research [92] [93] but has
never achieved practical implementation given the challenge of distributed trust and
available resources. Also, new techniques for real-time IDS are computationally
intensive [101]. F3DS could serve as a platform on which to build distributed IDS
utilizing the trust and resources available among peers within a social network.
6.5 Centralized vs Distributed Social Networks
Centralized as well as distributed social networks create mechanisms for users to
interact with each other. The information shared as part of those interactions must
have its privacy and security preserved.
Centralized social networks (Facebook, MySpace, etc.) typically use proprietary
and commonly undisclosed mechanisms to provide privacy and security between users.
The strength of those undisclosed mechanisms is questionable. Malicious entities
are continuously attempting to compromise social network accounts. Facebook has
disclosed that it detects over 600,000 attempts daily to compromise accounts on its
network [102]. Centralized social networks are commonly sponsored by corporations
which have incentives to mine the networks for information and statistics that hold
commercial value. A user of a Centralized social network must be concerned about not
only 3rd-party attacks against the user’s social network account, but also concerned
about the commercial incentives and trust-ability of the corporation running the social
network.
Distributed social networks (Safebook, LifeSocial, SMS, SMTP email, PeerSoN,
Diaspora, etc.), by their nature, must use published (and commonly standardized)
protocols for interaction between users. Therefore, the protocols and mechanisms
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used by distributed networks are commonly reviewed and scrutinized by a larger
number on individuals that those of Centralized social networks. Distributed social
networks avoid central databases and thus no single entity has control of or access to
the relationship and interaction information which defines a social network.
6.6 Social Motivators for Strong Security
The human relationships within social networks may also be leveraged as strong
motivators for behavioral change in users. Automatically generated security warnings
to, or communication restrictions (ostracism) [103] from, social peers might help
stigmatize those who are lax in deploying protection mechanisms. Fear of such
ostracism likely would promote proactive and preventative security practices among
social network users.
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